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ABSTRACT
This thesis will look at accountability problems associated with
public sector collective bargaining. The key issue is that decisions
surrounding the allocation of the major portion of a community's budget
is determined during, in most cases, closed negotiations between
public sector employees and employers.
The field of public education will serve as the basis for a dis-
cussion of the development of unionization and collective bargaining
and problems of accountability. Specific accountability issues will
be illustrated through description and discussion of the negotiations
and outcomes of the bargaining between the Boston School Committee and
the Boston Teachers Union.
Based on a set of specified criteria, four alternative approaches
to collective bargaining will be described. They will be viewed both
in terms of whether or not they help to ensure better accountability
for decision making in the negotiation process and the problems
associated with implementation.
The final product will be the design of a new approach to collective
bargaining in the public sector, again illustrated in the field of
public education. The process allows all key stake holders affected
by the outcomes of collective bargaining to hold the parties accountable
for the negotiated decisions.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
A. Introduction
On June 22, 1961, President Kennedy issued a memorandum establishing
a Task Force on Employee-Management Cooperation. The memorandum stated
that it was a right of all employees in the Federal Government to join
and participate in the activities of employee organizations. Further-
more, it continued:
The participation of Federal employees in
the formulation and implementation of
employee policies and procedures affecting
them contributes to the effective conduct
of public business.1
This right to organize, further recognized in Executive Order 10899 in
1962, gave impetus to the enactment of state statutes governing public
sector collective bargaining. The original intent, that is, for employees
to participate in policy formulation as a means of contributing to the
effective conduct of public business, has created a number of problems
that raise questions about the efficacy of public sector employee labor
negotiations as currently practiced.
The underlying concerns stem from the nature of government-provided
services and the method of generating revenues to provide those services.
H. L. Mencken, in his essay on government, argues that:
U. S. Civil Service Commission, Employee-Management Cooperation in the
Federal Service, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office,
August 1962, p. 4.
5
Whatever it is they (government employees)
seek, whether security, greater ease, more
money or more power, it has to come out of
the common stock, and so it diminishes the
shares of all other men. Giving a job
holder more power takes something away from
the liberty of us all: we are less free
than we were in proportion as he has more
authority.2
To give public employees more power through the collective bargaining
process affects not only the parties to the negotiation but all other men.
All of us support public employment through our taxes. The majority of a
municipal budget goes to salaries of public employees. Therefore, the
majority of the budget of a municipality is allocated through public
sector collective bargaining.
As collective bargaining in the public sector has evolved, little
attention has been given to the impacts of the decisions made during
labor negotiations on communities and the public who receives and pays for
the services. Those decisions may have an impact on the level and quality
of service. The question then is, because the collective bargaining
process does not operate in a vacuum, how can others affected by those
decisions participate in the bargaining process. More importantly, the
key issue to which this thesis is addressed is how can the public
affected by public sector labor relations hold the parties accountable
for the outcome of those decisions?
The thesis, then, will be divided into five chapters. Chapter I
will present an overview of the developments of the accountability
2
H. L. Mencken, Prejudices: A Selection, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1919, p. 180-181, Executive Order 10988, "Employee-Management
Cooperation in the Federal Service."
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problem in the public sector labor negotiations. It will first discuss
the emergence of the problem; second, describe the roots of the problem
in their economic, legal and social contexts; third, illustrate the
problems in the field of education, specifically as they relate to
balance of power, representativeness of the parties of their respective
constituencies, and fiscal stability. The final section will describe
characteristics of a collective bargaining process that would better
ensure accountability of the parties to the public.
Chapter II will provide a closer look at the development of unioni-
zation and collective bargaining in the field of public education. It
will be viewed nationally and more specifically in Massachusetts. The
union position on accountability to taxpayers, parents and students will
be presented and the final section will critique that position.
Chapter III will offer a discussion of the key problem of accounta-
bility in the negotiations between the Boston Teachers Union and the
Boston School Committee. The first section will provide an overview of
the environment within which teacher collective bargaining emerged. The
next section will present specific illustrations of how the bargaining
process creates accountability problems. The final section will analyze
the Boston case.
Chapter IV will look at four types of alternative bargaining
approaches currently practiced in labor negotiations in the field of
public education. A discussion of whether any of the alternatives
better ensure accountability will be presented, followed by a discussion
of implementation difficulties.
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Chapter V, the conclusion, will, based on evidence drawn from the
rest of the thesis, suggest a new approach to the collective bargaining
process. A process that allows the public access to the bargaining
demands of the parties, a process that requires justification for those
demands, and a process that provides a means of connecting negotiated
contract provisions to the level and quality of service in the field of
public education.
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B. The Emergence of the Accountability Problem in Public Sector Labor
Negotiations
In 1962, an Executive Order was issued by President Kennedy that
allowed government employees to form unions. 3 The order was
based on recommendations developed by the Task Force on Employee-Management
Cooperation established June 22, 1961. Collective bargaining, as it
has evolved in the private sector was thought by the Task Force to be
inappropriate to the public sector. Thus, the Executive Order specified
that:
Employees of the Federal Government shall
have, and shall be protected in the exercise
of, the right, freely and without fear of
penalty or reprisal, to form, join and assist
any employee organization, or to refrain from
any such activity. 4
The order further specified that (1) federal employees do not have the
right to strike; (2) the public interest must be paramount in a public
sector agreement; (3) arbitration is not appropriate in public sector
labor disputes; (4) when Congress fixes salaries and other conditions
of employment, these are not subject to negotiations; (5) all negotia-
tions and agreements must conform to civil service regulations; and
(6) professional and supervisory employees should be free to establish
employee organizations of their own. 5
The Order reserved to management a number of important prerogatives.
Management retained the right to direct employees, to take personal
3
27 Federal Register 551, January 19, 1962.
4
Ibid.
5
T. M. Stinnett, Turmoil in Teaching: A History of the Organizational
Struggle for America's Teachers. New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1968, p. 93.
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action, including disciplinary actions, to relieve employees from duty
because of lack of work or other legitimate reasons, to maintain effi-
ciency of Government operations, and to determine the means by which
such operations are to be conducted. 6
President Kennedy's Order stimulated the development of negotia-
tion procedures at the local and state levels as well. A number of
states passed laws stipulating the nature of bargaining relationships
in the public sector. Some called for mandatory negotiations, in either
the "meet and confer" or the collective bargaining form. Other statutes
permitted bargaining or meeting or conferring, or merely the presentation
of proposals to employers.7
The restrictions outlined in President Kennedy's Executive Order
have been eroded as state statutes governing collective bargaining have
been enacted. One government report concluded that the Executive Order
was, in fact, more significant for its effects on the bargaining rights
of state and local employees than for its rule concerning federal
employees, which remain quite restrictive. 8 Although
6
U. S. Civil Service Commission, op. cit. p. 4.
7
J. Weitzman, The Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector, New York:
Praeger, 1975, p. 40.
8
Paul Prasow, et al., Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector: Concepts
and Problems, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1972,
p. 53.
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a ban on strikes is still in force in most states, the number of actual
strikes initiated by public employees, as well as the number of threatened
strikes, has increased markedly, creating hardships for many cities and
towns across the country.9  While
the broader public interest, ostensibly ignored every time there is a
strike, is technically protected by elected officials who participate
in the bargaining process, there are many questions about the extent of
that protection.1 0  - Arbitration is now considered the
most appropriate technique for shutting off strikes in the public sector.
Salaries are still set for many federal employees, but certainly not for
all; and wage increases which consume the major portion of budgets of
state and local governmentsil are the cause of fiscal
instability in many localities. "Professional employees" in the public
sector continued to press for wage increases and the right, as "pro-
fessionals," to participate in collective bargaining.
9
Sterling Spero and John M. Capazzola, The Union Community and Its
Unionized Bureaucracies, New York: Dunellen, 1973, p. 268-269,
and Robert E. Walsh (ed.), Sorry ... No Government Today Unions v.
City Hall, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, p. 283.
10
Charles W. Cheng, Altering Collective Bargaining, New York: Praeger,
1976, p. 66.
11
Michael Lipsky, "The Assault on Human Services: Street Level Bureau-
crats, Accountability and Fiscal Crisis" in Scott Greer, et al. (eds.),
Accountability in Urban Society, California: Sage Publishing Co.,
1978, p. 17.
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As the collective bargaining process has evolved in the public
sector, so has the need to ensure that public employee unions, whose
actions can jeopardize so many residents and consumers, are accountable.
By accountability, I mean that all trade-offs and bargaining decisions be
made public and ultimately justified to the taxpayer. Unfortunately, all
too many negotiations are carried out behind closed doors. Moreover, the
parties in public sector collective bargaining are rarely obliged to
demonstrate to the public that particular outcomes or results have been
achieved. Chickering has suggested that accountability in collective
bargaining requires that an occupant of a role, as determined by a
negotiated contract, answer for the specific results of the work
expected of him in return for specified benefits.12
In order to ensure accountability in public sector labor negotia-
tions, a number of conditions must be met. First, employers must clearly
define employees' tasks. Second, employers must define measures of
performance and standards for comparison. Finally, employers must have
the power to impose incentives and sanctions on employee performance
contrary to agreed-upon standards.13
Employers may have a hard time ensuring accountability given the
nature of past agreements or state statutes governing the tenure rights
of certain employees. Where some agreements specify that employers have
the right to hire and fire, the language is often vague and performance
1 2Lawrence Chickering (ed.), Public Employee Unions, San Francisco,
California: Institute for Continuing Studies, 1976, p. 4.
1 3Lipsky, op. cit., p. 16.
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measures by which to guage whether one is "incompetent" or not are
rarely included. Under the circumstances, employers often find it
difficult to fire employees. Tenure statutes produce further frustration.
Most statutes guarantee tenure to employees after a specified period of
service. Once tenure is granted, lay-offs can affect only non-tenured
(i.e., less senior) employees. Once tenure is reached, seniority
becomes the sole basis for firing. Firing a person found to be incompetent
often requires a long process of documentation and hearings. It is often
easier to transfer a person to a less harmful position than to go through
the cumbersome process of removal.
Sanctions against public sector employees can take a number of
forms: economic, legal or moral. 14 Economic sanctions can be
used by firing. Some of the constraints on this approach have been noted.
Additionally, many such actions are contested in court where final
resolution occurs. Often, employers are found to be in violation of
one or another procedural steps in the firing process outlined in the
contract. Not only does this negate the effort to fire, but employees
judged to be incompetent must be reinstated with back pay if proper
procedures have not been followed. The issue, then, is not whether the
employee is in fact incompetent, but whether the legal process for
dismissal outlined in the contract was followed.
Legally, both employers and employees in the public sector must
comply with statutes at both the State and Federal level. They must
14
Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem, mimeographed, February 1981, p. 1.
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comply with state statutes governing education, health and safety, and
service delivery which may take the form of town by-laws as well.
Second, they must comply with federal and state statutes governing
civil service, retirement, tenure and other forms of employee protection.
Third, they must comply with requirements of collective bargaining
statutes governing public employees. Fourth, they must comply with the
terms of local negotiated contracts. Finally, they must comply with the
United States Constitution and the due process requirements of the 14th
Amendment.15
Thus, legal sanctions can be drawn from a number of
sources, and both parties have legal avenues for dealing with alleged
violations.
The employee is given the guaranteed right of grievance in most
labor relations contracts in the public sector. If an employee feels an
employer has been unfair, the contract provides for an outlined grievance
procedure. Often, however, a neutral third party is asked to hear the
complaint. This third party may be more concerned with process or pro-
cedure compliance than with the content of the case. This may not be in
the best interest of the efficient management of the organization or in
the interest of the public.
The employer, given the illegality of public sector strikes, can
file suit against employee organizations when strikes have been initiated.
Again, the sanctions are brought by the court in the form of injunctions
and fines. The unions can easily ignore the injunctions and the court
15
Dee Moschos, "Negotiating Under 2-", Massachusetts Municipal Associa-
tion Conference, March 7, 1981.
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is often compelled to increase the fines against the union. These fines,
however, are often in part absorbed by the state and national affiliate
of an employee union, thus negating the effectiveness of the sanction.
The employee organizations have an additional legal sanction that
they can bring to bear. Public employees, through their participation
in the electoral process, can impose economic and political pressure on
elected officials, the employer. Public employee unions can lobby in
support of or against the continued appointment of officials, sometimes
those who sit on the opposite side of the bargaining table. Employers
do not have the same participatory rights in the election of union
leaders. It would appear that employee organizations have some advantage
over employers in the types of legal sanctions they can impose for
alleged contract violations.
Moral sanctions imply that there is a universally perceived correct
method of behaving and that chastisement for contrary behavior will
inspire a person to conform. Moral obligations are somehow lost in
labor negotiations. The issues more often serve the self-interest of
the parties, not the interests of all people affected. One party may
publicly chastise the other for unrealistic demands, the other party may
bring counter arguments in an effort to impose embarrassment. The
charges are brought against one side or another, not individuals, thereby
disbursing the effectiveness of the sanction. Employers can chastise
employees for striking, arguing that they are hurting themselves and the
public. The employees can chastise employers for low salaries, terrible
working conditions in an effort to embarrass the employer into conceding
to demands. The employers can then blame other officials who hold the
15
purse strings, never considering the fact that the budget of any given
community is fairly rigid, and many strikes for higher pay come after
budget allocations have been determined. The efforts at moral persuasion,
then, have little effect on either party, each feeling its own position
to be the correct one. The weakness, I believe, is a function of the
organizational structure of government; the bureaucratization which
creates an impersonal, isolated environment for the individual, leading
to an attitude displayed as self-protection or self-interest. Too, there
is great diversity in the interpretation of what is morally correct, but
the public's interest should not be an afterthought.
Although sanctions then are available to both employers and
employees in the public sector, none is completely effective in ensuring
accountability of the parties to the negotiation to one another or to the
public. We might ask where the public - the taxpayers who provide the
financial resources - fits into the collective bargaining process.
What are the various means by which those affected by the results of
decisions that adversely affect the delivery of services can participate
in the bargaining process? They obviously have a legitimate interest
that ought to be heard before agreements are reached.
Collective bargaining in the public sector
is an integral part of the political process,
a procedure for reaching a political decision.
Once agreement is reached at the bargaining
table, many of the issues are largely fore-
closed. The political officials can be held
responsible at the polls, but without know-
ledge of the positions of the parties at the
16
bargaining table, the voter is handicapped
in making a judgment. 1 6
One key problem, therefore, and the problem to which this thesis is
addressed is what right does the public have to be heard in the collective
bargaining process in the public sector? Still more specifically, how
can those affected by labor negotiations in the public sector hold all
the negotiation parties accountable?
C. The Roots of the Accountability Problem
The inherent differences between the public and private sectors
call into question, at least for some observers, the appropriateness of
the traditional private sector bargaining model as it is often applied
in the public sector.17  The economic,
political and social contexts within which public sector bargaining is
carried out are quite special.
ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Public services are paid for with government generated revenue.
The revenue generating capacity of municipal government is constrained
by (1) the size of the tax base in a community; (2) the willingness of
the public to tax itself; and (3) constitutional and other legal limi-
tations on the amount and types of taxes local governments can raise.18
When there are severe budgetary constraints at the
16
Clyde W. Summers, "Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective."
Yale Law Review, Vol. 83, 1974, p. 1197.
17
Harry Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr. The Unions and the Cities,
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1971, p. 29-32.
18
Scott Greer, et al. (eds.), Accountability in Urban Society, California:
Sage Publishing Co., 1978, p. 218.
17
local level, costs cannot be absorbed if revenues are non-existent.
Furthermore, the increase in costs of public services cannot be automa-
tically passed on to the consumer (as in the case of the private sector).
Consumers do not participate voluntarily in the purchase of public
services and, most often, there is no competing provider of services to
whom to turn. The consumer of public services cannot withdraw and form
a separate system that guarantees his health and safety. Without a
majority of voters in agreement, it is difficult for a consumer to display
his dissatisfaction with the services being provided.19
Public managers sometimes achieve bargaining agreements and thus
avoid service disruption by promising employees excessively generous
pension and retirement benefits. Many elected officials are likely to
grant in-kind salary increases as long as they do not take effect in
the near future. It is politically easier to commit future rather than
current resources. Such concessions may not require immediate tax
increases but, in the long run, costs must be absorbed somehow.20
Public managers have less incentive than private managers to resist
union demands. If private managers make concessions that impair the
long-term profitability of a business, that fact will be reflected in
the value of the company. Thus, unlike their public sector counterparts,
private sector managers cannot avoid being held accountable when excessive
deferred benefits have been granted. 2 1
19
Lipsky, op. cit., p. 18.
20
Myron Lieberman, Public Sector Bargaining, Massachusetts: Lexington
Books, 1980, p. 56.
21
Ibid.
18
Increases in the cost of one public service may, due to budgetary
constraints, require that other services be limited in some way. The
increased costs for salaries in a service may not be tied in any way to
the quality of service or the importance of the service in terms of
protecting the health and safety of a community.
The economic problems created by public sector collective bargaining
depend on a community's fiscal stability. The problem of accountability
in the negotiation process is raised most vociferously when resources
are scarce.
POLITICAL CONTEXT
Public sector collective bargaining has given public employees a
right to participate in the formulation of public policy. The scope of
bargainable issues has steadily increased to include those that are
non-economic in nature. Difficulty has arisen concerning just where to
draw the line between those issues constituting public policies and those
in a grey area which are policies that directly affect working conditions,
the latter, in most cases, being issues that are negotiable. The "co-
determination" of policy by employers and employees is seen by some to
restrict management rights to direct employees in the delivery of
service. 22
Public unions 'as they have evolved, with the help of national affilia-
tions, have developed sophisticated negotiation techniques and strategies.
22
David H. Rosenbloom, "Accountability in the Administrative State"
in Scott Greer, et al. (eds.), Accountability in Urban Society,
California: Sage Publishing Co., 1978, p. 101.
19
Local officials have turned to professional negotiators to assist them
in the bargaining process. Within the time it took employers to under-
stand the impact of employee organizations on their decision-making power,
many rights had been removed and prior contract provisions had to be
upheld. The issue, then, is the effect of negotiations on an employer's
ability to manage its employees and the service it is responsible for
providing.23
Since some of the rights of employers have been removed during
labor negotiations, it is also questionable whether or not they can be
said to represent all segments of the community in the negotiation process.
The electoral process allows the public to select and reject public
officials in part, based on the extent to which they have been able or
appear to respond to citizen concerns. The degree to which elected
officials, particularly in urban areas, can represent the interests of a
heterogenous population, however, has been seriously questioned.24
Our system of representative democracy
depends on the willingness of our rep-
resentatives to "trade votes." This is
how compromise is reached in our political
system. One problem ... is that it
ignores the depth and intensity of con-
cern that certain groups or in erests
have about particular issues.
The elected officials, when making policy decisions, legally must
consider the interests of all. They must decide which policies to support
23
David Lewin, "Public Employment Relations Confronting the Issues,"
Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, #3, October 1973, p. 310.
24
Cheng, op. cit. p. 66.
25
Lawrence Susskind, "Resolving Environmental Disputes Through Ad Hocracy."
Resolve: Center for Environmental Conflict Resolution, Summer 1980, p. 3.
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and which to reject. But if the unions have restricted the rights of
management through gains made at the bargaining table, the rights to
direct employees and services, then the unions to a degree have veto
power over policy with no legal responsibility for their impact on other
public interests. The union officials are not elected by the public and
are accountable only to their membership. 2 6
In sum, the political context in which public sector bargaining
occurs allows for the "codetermination" of public policy decisions
between employers and employees through a process of concession and
trade-off. The ability of elected officials to represent the interests
of all groups with a stake in the outcome is brought into question.
Furthermore, it would appear that, although the broader public can hold
public officials accountable to a degree through the electoral process,
the union representatives who help determine policy are elected only by
their membership. The public is provided no means of holding the union
accountable for their share of the decision making that affects the
provision of service.
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
The development of professional associations (based on the model of
industrial collectives) serves to negate the original intention of public
services. Employees no longer see themselves as "public servants" but
rather as professionals. The definition of professional implies
autonomy or self-government without control by others. The blue collar
21
2 6Lieberman, op. cit., p. 85.
industrial model of bargaining would seem antithetical to that defini-
tion.
The increase in the size of government agencies produced a need for
additional layers of administrative staffs. With the increase in the
size of organizational structures came a feeling of isolation on the part
of those at the bottom, the providers of the actual service. Public
employee unionism, then, grew in part due to what employees considered a
reduction in control over their own destinies.
In order for any large system to work effectively, there is a need
for performance based on obedience, respect for authority, and adherence
to rules and regulations. 2 7  Central control, by
necessity, demands conformity and uniformity. 2 8  The
employees, lost in the shuffle of centralization, united in order to
have their concerns addressed by those with authority; those at the top
of the structure. Unionism provided a mechanism for sidestepping the
cumbersome process by which individual employees could raise concerns.
An outgrowth of demands for a voice in the determination of wages
and working conditions was a call for job security. The civil service
system under which some government employees are regulated was intended
to ensure job security based on "merit" rather than patronage and
nepotism.2 9  Although acceptance into the civil service
2 7 George W. Taylor, "The Public Interest in Collective Negotiations in
Education." Phi Delta Kappan, XLVIII, September 1966, p. 14.
2 8Donald A. Myers, Teacher Power - Professionalization and Collective
Bargaining, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973, p. 82.
29
E. S. Savas and Sigmund G. Gunsburg, "The Civil Service: A Meritless
System? The Public Interest, Spring 1980, p. 70.
22
system requires an examination, once hired and on the job for six months,
the possibility of even being fired is limited. 3 0
Seniority - number of years in service - is the sole basis for promotion.
Similar protective personnel provisions have been won by public employees
at the bargaining table.
In times of economic expansion, the personnel practices had less
impact on the broader social goals of equal employment opportunities for
those who had been excluded from the job market. What occurs in times of
economic contraction, however, is the necessity of decreasing the number
of employees. Those dismissed are the less senior employees and, most
likely, those hired to provide a remedy for past discriminatory hiring
practices.
Why employers did not initiate attempts to modify personnel practices
could have a number of causes. Employers may not have considered the
possibility of economic decline during their term of office. Additionally,
the development of performance measures for public sector service pro-
viders is still thought to be difficult given the degree of discretion
employees can exhibit in their work.3 1 It
is not unreasonable for public employees who have spent their service
careers conforming and obeying to be skeptical and defensive towards
the public as it cries out for some method of measuring the quality of
service. It would seem no less unreasonable to provide the public with
evidence to support the fact that the money paid to public employees is
23
Ibid., p. 71.
3 1Lipsky, op. cit., p. 16.
being spent legitimately in an effort to provide the highest quality of
service.
The roots of the accountability problem then, stem from a number of
developments that have economic, political and social implications. It
is not fair, in times of fiscal constraint, to hold public employees
hostage to the limited resources available. It seems equally unfair to
expect the public to continue helping to generate more revenues to pay
for services for which the rate of pay is in no way related to the quality
of service.
The "codetermination" of policy by the parties to the labor negotia-
tions does affect the quality of service. If people are dissatisfied
with the quality of service, one would think that both employers and
employees would want to jointly determine how to improve that service.
Having to justify the decisions and results of negotiations would seem
to be one way of allowing the public some insight into the constraints
placed on both parties. The balance of power now is on the side of the
union who can decide policy, but, at present, offers the public no
mechanism for understanding nor holding the union accountable for the
results of the decisions.
D. The Accountability Problem in the Field of Education
In the field of education, a number of issues are raised with
respect to accountability in teacher and school board negotiations.
First, whether through the collective bargaining process, an imbalance
of power has been created. Second, whether or not, given the diversity of
the student population and complexity of the educational system,
24
elected school boards can represent the interests of all students in
the negotiation process. Additionally, there is a question as to
whether teacher unions can adequately represent the diversity of their
membership. Finally, there is the issue of fiscal stability and the
problems created through the negotiation process. The critical factor
here is that the allocation of resources for education do not seem to
be tied either to a community's ability to pay or the quality of educational
services.
The legal responsibility for education is vested in the state. The
state, in turn, delegates a large measure of authority to local school
boards to ensure effective educational service. The creation of many
new programs administrated at a central level caused the gap between
the school board and the classroom teachers to widen. In order to have
some control over the teaching environment, teacher collective bargaining
contracts have more and more secured provisions relating to educational
policy once deemed to be clearly within the managerial and legal juris-
diction of the local school boards. Rights are spelled out concerning
class size, curriculum planning, teacher hours and discipline.3 2
The teachers closest to students should have
some say in what and how they teach. Unfortunately, the effort to
jointly work toward a better system of providing education was lost
in the push for higher wages on the part of the teachers, and management,
in the process, became preoccupied with its right to set policy.
3 2Spero and Capozzola, op. cit., p. 174.
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(Unionism) increases an institution's
vulnerability. It replaces the sense
of community and common purpose with an
adversarial posture: labor is made to
appear the opponent of management.3 3
Although strikes are illegal in almost all states, the school boards
have no means to prevent such disruptions without making some quick
concessions. Whether or not the school board holds fast to its position,
there are children who are directly affected by the strikes: the students'
education is disrupted, the continuity of instruction is lost. Parents,
too, must find alternative placement for their younger children while
they are at work.
Teacher unions wield an additional power which is political in
nature. Public employee unions are involved in a variety of political
activities. They lobby in support of educational legislation, in support
of political candidates, offering campaign contributions and employee
time for actual political campaigning.34 They may even help to elect
the officials with whom they bargain.35
The balance of power, then, would appear to be on the side of
teacher unions. They can affect educational policy, help to elect
local school board members and create pressure to have demands met by
strikes or even the threat of a strike.
3 3Robert C. Wood, "The Disassembling of American Education." Daedalus,
Summer 1980, p. 107.
3 4Walter Garm, Economics & Politics of Public Education, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1978, p. 108.
3 5Roger Dahl, speaking at meeting of Industrial Relations Research
Association, Denver, Colorado, September 1980, as reported in 879,
Government Employee Relations Report, p. 24. (Hereafter cited as GERR.)
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The second issue is that of the ability of the parties to represent
their respective constituencies at the bargaining table. With limited
resources, the increase in teacher salaries may prohibit the addition of
programs to support students requiring special help in the form of
remedial reading, bilingual education, to name only two. Many special
education programs are currently funded through state and federal assis-
tance. With cutbacks in aid to education and limited local resources,
school systems may not be financially capable of absorbing costs
incurred by cuts. Union demands may aid in prohibiting the absorption
of those costs. If services cannot be provided to all students, then
the school board cannot be said to protect and represent the interests
of all students under the board's jurisdiction.
The interests of union membership have increased, too, in order to
provide special services to all students. Those teachers hired with more
skills and specialized training, in times of economic instability and
declining enrollments, will be the first to be layed off. The protective-
ness of public personnel systems, gained in part through labor negotiations,
will require the retention of more senior teachers with less expertise
in specific fields. Additionally, school systems which have adopted
affirmative action policies may find that teachers hired under these
policies will also be among those dismissed.
Finally, the issue of representation is raised in conjunction with
the development of sophisticated negotiation techniques on the part of
unions, with the aid of national affiliations. School boards, lacking
the same degree of national instruction, have turned to labor relations
experts to participate in the actual negotiation process. As one study
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has pointed out, most local school boards avoid active participation in
negotiations with teachers. Their participation is limited to general
instructions and approval of the final contract. The study noted that
the delegation of responsibility for bargaining to professionals fosters
routinization and perhaps harmony at the expense of real participation by
elected representatives of the public. 3 6
The representativeness of the parties to the negotiation of their
constituencies has been called into question because of the changes in
the recognized needs of public school students and the changes in the
teaching force. The use of labor relations experts on the part of both
parties causes an emphasis to be placed on negotiating techniques, per-
haps with the substantive educational issues being considered only as an
afterthought.
The ability of a community to pay for education continues to create
problems for local school boards. Seldom are the dollar amounts spent
per child on education tied to the quality of service. In times of
fiscal constraint, the public becomes more aware of the amount of money
being spent for education and might wonder how and for whom. Attempts
to institute some form of performance measures for teachers have been
effectively displaced. There are many difficulties in determining the
methods of measurement and who administersthe evaluation. It must be
argued, though, that it is in the best interests of both parties to have
their decisions and performance results assessed. Only then can the
3 6Lorraine McDonnell and Anthony Pascal, Organized Teachers in American
Schools, Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corp., 1978, p. 75-82.
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public be assured that monies are being spent in an efficient manner.
The constraints under which collective bargaining operates, if unknown,
will allow the public to assume that inadequate service is due either to
mismanagement or ineffective teaching practices, while the problems may
be far more complex. The lack of performance measures allows teachers
to make demands for wage increases as entitlements rather than as rewards
for their efforts at improving the quality of educational instruction.
Fiscal problems arise also when contract allocations are not
coordinated with a community's budgetary process. This sometimes happens
when negotiations reach impasse which may place the final decision in
the hands of a third party. Most state statutes provide for fact finding,
mediation and arbitration. These procedures may delay the final resolution
of conflicts and agreement beyond the deadlines for budget submission.
The fiscal problems associated with public sector bargaining do
have implications for the delivery of educational services. There is a
need to provide a mechanism for tying the quality of educational services
to budget allocations and the need to better coordinate collective
bargaining with the budgetary process of communities.
The problem of accountability in the field of public educational
labor negotiation has political, economic and social implications.
Collective bargaining does not occur in a vacuum. The decisions made
in the negotiations between teachers and school boards do affect the
service provided. A mechanism must be established whereby parties can
hold one another accountable for the implementation of the decisions
but, more importantly, that the public must be afforded the right to
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the justifications for the demands and outcomes of the bargaining
process.
The next section, then, will outline characteristics of a collective
bargaining process that will better ensure accountability of the parties
to one another and to the public.
E. Characteristics of a Bargaining Process That Would Better Ensure
Accountability
Thus far, the emphasis of this thesis has been placed on describing
the problems associated with accountability in the public sector collective
bargaining process. This section will describe elements of a bargaining
process that might help to remedy some of those problems. The first
feature would be the establishment of mechanisms to enhance public
awareness of the collective bargaining process. A second feature would
provide some measure for reassessing goals of the service with an eye
towards a method of tying costs to client needs and satisfaction. Once
goals had been set, a third feature would entail specification of explicit
rights and responsibilities of both parties, which would include setting
standards for both employers and employees. The final characteristic
would call for better coordination of public sector service negotiations,
based on the economic constraints of communities and the consideration
of impacts one service decision must have on remaining services.
A bargaining process that ensures accountability would provide a
mechanism for educating the public about conflicts, constraints and
alternatives considered during the bargaining process. As long as the
key stakeholders, especially those affected directly by service delivery
decisions, are kept in ignorance, accountability cannot be ensured.
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A process of this type might include a mechanism for public access
to the parties' original demands with justifications for their being
pursued. Workshops could be held in which the public could be given
information on how the process works, who participates, how the process is
coordinated with the budget-making process, and perhaps the criteria
upon which decisions are made.
The nature of public service has changed with technological innova-
tions, updated methods of service provisions, but the structure of the
bargaining process has remained the same. The goals of public service
provision seem to have been lost. These goals must be modified if
necessary, but must be given more emphasis during the negotiation process.
Both parties have a stake in the outcomes but neither seems willing to
take the responsibility for the decisions. As long as public officials
do not clearly define what it is they want or how they would like services
to be provided, then employees can only do what they feel to be right,
which may not be in the best interests of all concerned.
Once goals have been established, the parties then must begin to
look at the collective bargaining process in terms of who gets what and
why. The parties must jointly determine how service provision can be
improved. This would necessitate the institution of standards of per-
formance somehow linked to performance incentives. Unions, for some
reason, feel any type of accolade destroys the collective efforts of
their membership. It would seem that if some employees can provide
more adequate service, their knowledge and ability to perform should
be viewed as instructive. That is, as an instrument for the improvement
of other employee performance, not as a measure of collective inefficiency.
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The job security clauses gained through bargaining with no concomitant
incentives to update skills and knowledge have provided only a dis-
incentive to enhance the quality of service. The shift must come through
a willingness of the parties to modify their adversarial posture; to
reassert and commit themselves to the original intentions of public
sector collective bargaining, which was to jointly work towards a more
efficient system of service provision.
There is a need to require that the parties to public sector
negotiations consider the impact of their demands on other services,
calling for more coordination between the various contract negotiation
processes. Rather than fighting over scarce resources, there is a need
to work together to establish priorities for each service and to determine
how the provisions of one contract might enhance and help the decision-
making process of negotiation for another. One service organization
working jointly with employees may find some way of cutting costs that
does not affect the quality of service nor require lay-offs. These
types of decisions could very well be modified and effectively used by
other public sector services.
These characteristics then would better ensure that the decisions
made were based on some criteria that was in some way prioritized. It
would allow those affected by the decision to know why the decision was
made and by whom. Additionally, a basis for performance would be
established that allowed the successful efforts of some employees to be
used constructively to improve the work of others. It should be in the
joint self-interest of the parties to improve the services because if the
costs can be justified and are linked to the quality, then the public
will be more willing to help in the process of providing more revenues.
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At the present time, there is no real incentive for the public to con-
tinue paying more taxes without an appreciable increase in the level
of service.
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CHAPTER II
ACCOUNTABILITY AND UNIONIZATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. Introduction
Unionization and collective bargaining in the teaching profession
emerged from the confluence of social forces. Most state statutes
were enacted in the 1960's, a decade characterized by protest, dissent
and radicalism.37 Students and faculty at campuses across the nation
held demonstrations demanding more control over educational policy
decisions. In February 1962, 4,000 students traveled to Washington,
D. C., to emphasize the degree of dissatisfaction with national
policy at home as well as abroad. While the war was escalating in
Vietnam, the United States was fraught with violence. In September
1963, the bombing of a Baptist Church in Alabama left two black
children dead. In March 1964, racial strife erupted in Jacksonville,
Florida, when attempts were made to integrate bars and restaurants.
The disappearance of three civil rights workers in Mississippi in June
of that same year caused riots to break out across the country, cul-
minating with the riot in Watts, California, in August 1965.38
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination in public
facilities and public education. The act denied employers license
to discriminate in their hiring practices and denied labor unions
the power to keep blacks from their membership roster.
3 9
3 7Leroy Ashby and Bruce M. Stave, The Discontented Society, New York:
Rand McNally and Co., 1972, p. 287.
3 8Ovid Demaris, America the Violent, Maryland: Cowles Book Company,
Inc., 1970, p. 209-216.
3 9Richard Kluger, Simple Justice, The History of Brown v. Board of
Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1975, Vol. II, p. 955.
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The Act also applied to all existing federal aid programs,
including those supporting education. In 1965, the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act was passed providing financial assistance to
school systems with concentrations of children from low income families
to expand and improve programs to meet the educationally deprived child-
ren's special needs. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
was authorized to cut off federal funding to school systems not in
compliance with Title IV Section 401 of the Civil Rights Act governing
the desegregation of public schools.
Unionization grew concomittantly with the struggles for recognition
of the rights of equality. Unionization of teachers was also supported
by the larger labor movement due to the increase in the white collar work
force. The Federal Executive Order extending bargaining rights to
government employees in 1962 gave rise to state statutes extending
bargaining rights to municipal employees. These movements grew from
the public's cries in the 1960's for economic, political and social
reform. The following section will look at the development of teacher
collective bargaining, nationally and in Massachusetts.
B. The Development of Unionization and Teacher Collective Bargaining:
Nationally and Specifically in Massachusetts
Educational associations have been in existence for over a hundred
years and for over half of that period, relied on informal methods of
requesting changes in wages and working conditions. The American Federal
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of Labor (AF of L) found its membership decreasing in the 1960's. Where
the work force was once blue collar, it was predominantly white collar in
1962 and only 7 percent of the white collar working force was organized.4 0
The desire of the American Federal of Labor to
increase its membership found the changing nature of the teaching work
force ripe for active organizing.
Teachers were becoming far more militant than in the past. A
profession once dominated by women found many more men entering the field
of public education. More teachers were acquiring advanced degrees and
with their higher level of professional status, they began demanding a
higher level of compensation.4 The
social unrest in the country at that time could not have been ignored
by anyone, thus its impact must be noted as well. Finally, the rivalry
between the two educational associations, The National Teachers Association
and the American Federation of Teachers, gave the struggles for recogni-
tion a national forum for vocalizing dissatisfaction.
The National Education Association was founded in 1857 "to elevate
the character and advance the interests in the teaching profession and
to promote the cause of popular education in the U. S."4 2
Membership drives were directed toward all educational personnel at all
educational levels (teachers as well as administrators). The original
mechanism for "professional negotiations" was the reliance on the use of
regular educational channels to improve working conditions.
40
Stinnert, op. cit., p. 23.
4 1Myers, op. cit., p. 65.
4 2Walsh, op. cit., p. 116.
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The domination of the NEA by administrators arose due to its emphasis on
education on a national scale; that is, its emphasis on the overall
provision of services by all levels of teachers and administrators.
Association energies were almost entirely devoted to such issues as
standards and ethics, tasks of lobbying for federal funds, the conduct
and dissemination of research, and the support of state affiliates.
4 3
The domination of the NEA by administrators was
largely responsible for the development of a rival organization: The
American Federation of Teachers, chartered by the AF of L in 1916.
The American Federation of Teachers was searching for a mechanism
through which teachers, not administrators, could pursue "conditions
essential to the best professional service."4
4
The rivalry between the NEA and AFT grew out of differences in
educational philosophies. An NEA official stated: "The two organizations
are made up of people who have different preferences on some basic
structural, ideological issues and relationship questions. Thus the
two organizations fight because they are competing for the loyalty of the
same group of people - American teachers."4 5
The AFT took no fixed policy position on the subject of collective
bargaining until well after the second world war. Although both the
4 3Alan Rosenthal, Pedagogues and Power: Teacher Groups in School
Politics, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969, p. 5.
4 4 Stanley Elam, Myron Lieberman and Michael Moskow, Readings on Collec-
tive Negotiations in Public Education, Chicago: Rand McNally &
Co., 1968, p. 229-230.
4541 GERR 105, November 21, 1977.
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AFT and NEA had long supported teacher participation in determining
school policy, neither organization supported the establishment of formal
collective negotiations at the local level as a matter of national policy.
By 1947, both organizations had shifted ground, both calling for group
participation in policy formulation and endeavoring to educate the mass
of teachers in the use of political power to enhance their influence.4 6
The rivalry became most vocal in the 1960's as the AFL-
CIO began a campaign to increase its membership. James Carey, then
Vice President of the AFL-CIO, spoke at the NEA Conference in Denver in
1962. He was critical of the NEA's use of the word "professionalism"
as a substitute for economic dignity.4 7  "They are glad to
accept a title, a pat on the head, or a Christmas bonus in lieu of decent
wages and working conditions."4 8
The NEA resolved at the convention to push for collective negotiations
legislation for teachers but vowed that under no circumstances would the
resolution of differences between school boards and teacher associations
49be sought through channels set up for handling industrial disputes.
Both organizations maintained a no-strike policy until
the mid 1960's. Strikes prior to this time were locally initiated. By
1966, the AFT, while preserving its former no-strike policy, did grant
support for strikes under "certain circumstances," particularly when
affiliated internationals offered them a vote of confidence for the
4 6Spero and Capazzola, op. cit., p. 97.
4 7Stinnert, op. cit., p. 7.
4 8Ibid.
4 9Myers, op. cit., p. 98.
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actions.5 0  By 1972, the NEA also had shifted its position
on the use of strikes as one means of increasing its membership.
The membership of the NEA and the AFT has grown over the years. In
1966, the AFT represented 110,000 teachers. The NEA membership during the
same year included 940,000 teachers, mostly from rural areas. 5 1 The NEA,
due to its representation of all educational personnel, has then consis-
tently drawn a larger membership. By 1977, the memberships of both
declined. For the NEA, the membership had dropped from 1.9 million in
1976 to 1.7 million. The AFT lost approximately 30,000 members during
that year - with a decrease in membership from 471,000 to 441,000.52
Both actively campaigned for representation of unorganized teachers.
The NEA, although changing some of its policies, still maintained a
professional stance. By 1980, the President of the AFT, Albert Shanker,
noted that the union was set up essentially as a traditional labor
organization interested in wages and working conditions. In recent
years, he stated that "our members felt a bit ashamed - they wanted
something they could be proud of. In other words, they want an organiza-
tion that could help them advance professionally; therefore, the union is
becoming more concerned with teaching methods, curriculum and standards."
5 3
The representational elections for union affiliation grew as states
began enacting collective bargaining statutes. The legal basis for
5 0Ibid., p. 124.
5 1Michael H. Moskow, Teachers and Unions, Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1968, p. 75.
5241 GERR 105, November 21, 1977.
5 3Albert Shanker, New York Times, July 11, 1980, p. Bl.
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unionization and collective bargaining, as noted earlier, was an out-
growth of a presidential executive order issued in 1962. Prior to 1960,
the courts, with few exceptions, held that public employees had no
constitutional right to join or form unions and, too, that legislative
bodies could affirmatively forbid their employees from joining or
forming some or all unions.54
The court, then, also played a role in stimulating the unionization
of public sector employees. In 1968, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
7th Circuit held for the first time, in McLaughlin v. Tilendis, that
"An individual's right to form and join a union is protected by the
First Amendment." The case involved two teachers who instituted suit
against a local school district alleging that their teaching contract
had not been renewed because of their activities on behalf of the
American Federation of Teachers. The court noted: "The Civil Rights
Act of 1871 gives them a remedy if their contracts were not renewed
because of their exercise of constitutional rights." While public
employees have a constitutional right to join and form unions, there is
no constitutional right to force a public employer to bargain collectively
in the absence of legislation. The 7th Circuit, in a decision subsequent
to McLaughlin, stated that "there is no constitutional duty to bargain
collectively with an exclusive bargaining agent. Such duty when imposed
is imposed by statute." (Indianapolis Education Association v. Lewallin,
1969).55 Affirming a constitutional right to collectively bargain would
5 4Lee C. Shaw in Sam Zagoria (ed.), Public Workers Public Unions, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1972, p. 21-22.
5 5Ibid.
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have first removed an individual's right to due process. The states,
however, could enact, through legislation, statutes governing the rights
of public employees to bargain collectively.
Although several states had informal bargaining relationships
prior to enabling legislation, the push towards a legal basis for
collective action grew rapidly. There are currently 42 states with laws
or policies covering collective bargaining by public employees. In
33 states plus the District of Columbia, the right of state and local
employees to organize has been sanctioned by statutes, court decisions,
attorney general opinions or executive order. Eighteen of these states
have laws specifically granting rights to public school teachers.
Comprehensive laws in 16 jurisdictions also extend bargaining rights to
educational employees. 5 6  (See Appendix II)
There is no consistent pattern to the laws concerning the scope of
bargaining. For example, the Washington State statute includes as
negotiable items: curriculum, textbook selection, in-service training,
student teaching programs, personnel hiring and assignment practices,
leaves of absence, salaries and salary schedules, and non-instructional
duties. The Hawaii statute, on the other hand, is quite restrictive.
Under this law, it is illegal to include in collective bargaining
provisions issues which "interfere with the rights of public employers
to direct its employees to set qualifications, standards of work, the
nature and content of examinations, to hire, to promote, transfer,
5641 GERR 152, November 21, 1977.
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assign and retain employees in positions." But public employees in
Hawaii, after exhausting state machinery, have been legally given the
right to strike.57 (Cheng qualifying paper, cites William and Mary
Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 4.)
The Washington State and Hawaii statutes serve to illustrate the
variation in content of the state statutes governing public sector
collective bargaining. The Washington Statute clearly defines many
issues as bargainable, thereby recognizing that cooperative joint decision
making may be conducive to organizational efficiency and stability, by
providing a forum in which teachers can have a say in what and how they
are to teach. Restricting participation in decision making recognizes
that there are rights that school boards must retain in order to effec-
tively direct and manage employees. The Hawaii statute excludes personnel
decisions from the bargaining table but balances the power held by each
in allowing employees the right to strike.
Other statutes fall somewhere between these two extreme cases.
Many states exclude educational policy decisions from the bargaining
table, as in Maine, Minnesota and Gregon. Others, such as Connecticut,
may leave what is bargainable in educational policy to the discretion of
school boards. Many of the ultimate decisions concerning what is bargain-
able is left up to the courts.
Often the parties can pass the responsibility for resolving their
conflicts on to others: courts, labor relations boards, and arbitrators.
5 7Charles W. Cheng, "The Scope of Teacher Negotiations in the Evolutionary
Development of the Collective Bargaining Process", mimeographed,
Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1974, p. 22.
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Some statutes allow for labor relations boards to determine when an
impasse is reached and, once determined, the process for resolution may
be through fact finding, mediation or arbitration. This does not mean
that there is not a legitimate need for a process that allows resolution
after the parties have come to a standstill in the negotiations. The
process of using third parties, and particularly the courts, has been
perhaps relied upon too much.
The 1970's brought attempts on the part of education associations to
have national legislation enacted to extend collective bargaining rights
to teachers unprotected at that time. The Congressional Hearings on
proposed bills also cited the difficulties inherent in the diversity of
state statutes and the numerous other regulations (town by-laws, attorney
general opinions) affecting collective bargaining which often made it
impossible to determine teacher rights. 5 8
One bill would remove the National Labor Relations Act's exclusion
of public employees, to treat public and private sector employees
equally. The second bill would establish an independent National Public
Employment Relations Commission and provide bargaining rights to employees
and employers in states and their political subdivisions. The Commission
would be responsible for interpreting, applying and enforcing the pro-
visions of the Alternative Passage. Passage of national legislation has
not occurred, however, in part because public employee labor organizations
58Congressionman, Max Bauccus, in Congressional Record, Vol. 121,
Part 27, October 30, 1975, p. 34515.
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disagree about the form the legislation should take. 5 9
In summary, the national development of unionization and teacher
collective bargaining emerged at a time of civil discontent among many
segments of the population. The federal government responded not only
to the need to establish equal rights for all but also to the desire of
the labor force to participate in decisions affecting the work place.
These developments gave rise to state collective bargaining statutes,
varying in the scope and level of employee participation in decision
making.
Massachusetts was not exempt from the racial confrontations of the
1960's. In 1964, the legislature enacted the Racial Imbalance Act which
was to encourage school committees to adopt as educational objectives
the promotion of racial balance and to correct existing imbalances in
the school. This Act, coupled with the rights to bargain collectively,
provided teachers with a mechanism for aiding school committees in the
determination of policies that would allow more equal education for all
students.
Teachers, as well as other municipal employees, were first given
the right to join organizations and bargain collectively in 1965.
(Chapter 763 of the Massachusetts General Laws) The Law gave employees
the right through representation of their own choosing to bargain on
questions of wages, hours and other working conditions of employment and
"to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
5 9 Thomas Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations, Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1980, p. 455.
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bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, free from actual inter-
ference, restraint or coercion; provided representative in the unit
shall be the exclusive bargaining agent ... bargaining collectively for
all employees, and be responsible for representing the interests of all
such employees."60
The State Labor Relations Commission is authorized to conduct
representative elections to select exclusive bargaining agents, to deter-
mine appropriate units of representation and to enforce the prohibited
practices section of the statute. The Commission is further given the
power to issue orders requiring the parties to cease and desist from the
practices prohibited by statute. The Commission is also authorized to
impose penalties such as withdrawing certification of an employee organi-
zation, ordering reinstatement with or without back pay or of a discharged
employee, or directing either party to pay the entire cost of fact
finding. 6 1
A subsequent statute, Chapter 1078 of the Acts of 1973, further
amended by the addition of Chapter 150E in 1975, defined the procedures
for bargaining more carefully. What is bargainable is modified to
include wages, hours, standards of productivity and performance, and any
other terms and conditions of employment. 6 2  The parties
must still bargain in advance of the budget making process. An elaborate
grievance procedure is outlined, culminating in final and binding
6 0Acts and Resolves of the General Court of Massachusetts, 1965,
Chapter 763, p. 556.
6 1Myron Lieberman and Michael Moskow, Collective Negotiations for Teachers,
Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966, p. 49.
6 2Derek Bok & John Dunlop, Labor and the American Community, New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1970, p. 18.
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arbitration. This provision is to be invoked in the event of any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of such written
agreement.
The statutes raise several questions about municipal budgets and
the scope of bargaining. The Massachusetts State Department of Education,
in its guide to collective bargaining, stated that there were several
factors that had to be considered in formulating economic requests.
These factors include: (1) general attitude of the community toward
spending money for education; (2) the current tax rate and whether it
had risen appreciably in the recent past; (3) the tax base available to
the community and its relative stability; (4) per pupil expenditures; and
(5) the amount of reimbursement received from the Commonwealth.6 3
Although the ability to pay question is
to be considered in formulating economic requests and prior to the budget
making process, this does not always occur and may present hardships on
communities.
The scope of bargaining in Massachusetts is quite broad. The
State Department's guide suggested that if both parties agree to an
issue as bargainable, then all is well; if one party refuses, the other
may file a charge of unfair practice with the Labor Relations Commission
whose decision, if not respected by a party, can be taken to the State
Court for final determination.
The courts in Massachusetts have generally decided that there are
63Massachusetts State Department of Education, "Guide to Collective
Bargaining in the Public Sector" cited in 319 GERR E-1, November 20,
1969.
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subjects which are beyond the scope of collective bargaining: specific
appointments, tenure determinations as well as the school committee's
decisions to abolish positions. These have been found to be within the
zone of management prerogative over educational policy.
"However, even where certain ultimate
decisions may or have been deemed to be
so laced with educational policy as to
go beyond the reach of bargaining and
arbitration, we have upheld arbitral
awards which have merely involved ques-
tions of adherence by the school committee
to procedures set forth in collective
bargaining agreement for resolving such
determinations." (389 N.E. 2nd 974) 64
Chapter 71 of the General Laws of Massachusetts governs the provision
of public education in the state. The Chapter at Section 37 gives school
committees the general charge of all public schools. School committees
retain the right to dismiss tenured teachers (at Section 41, tenure is
given to teachers who have served three consecutive years in the system)
for "inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher, insubor-
dination or other good cause." No teacher can be dismissed unless by a
two-thirds vote of the whole school committee; a tenured teacher must be
given 30 days notice of intent prior to vote. If he requests, he must
be furnished with written charges of the cause, given a hearing at which
he may be represented by counsel, present evidence and call witnesses
to testify in his behalf; charges must be substantiated; and the
superintendent must give his recommendations. Non-tenured teachers
64 School Committee of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, 28 Mass. 389
N.E. 2nd 970 at 974.
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are given the same rights as those who are tenured, the only difference
being the number of days notice prior to the committee's vote.
Tenure legislation was enacted to give some stability to the
teaching staff. By attracting and retaining able teachers who served
long enough to become familiar with the pupils and the community, schools
derived increased professional benefits. From the teacher's point of
view, service solely at the pleasure of a school board placed jobs in
annual jeopardy. Critics note the protectiveness of tenure statutes and
the inability of boards to dismiss incompetent teachers. 6 5
Others note that these statutes do not negate a board's opportunity
and responsibility to select, screen, supervise and evaluate teachers
prior to and during tenured employment.66
Where school boards have instituted evaluations, dismissed non-
tenured teachers have often filed suits for unfair practices. The
courts have generally found that school boards have violated evaluation
procedures. In a number of cases decided in 1977, the court found that
the decision not to renew a contract of a non-tenured teacher was not
arbitratable; however, the failure of the school committee to adhere to
teacher evaluation procedures before making the decision was an arbitra-
table issue. 6 7
"If a school committee wishes to deny
application of evaluation procedures to
non-tenured teachers or to deny such
teachers the right to arbitration, the
school committee can say so explicitly
65William R. Hazard, Education and the Law, New York: The Free Press,
1971, p. 28.
6 6Ibid.
67Danvers v. Tyman. Mass. 360 N.E. 2nd 877, 1977, at page 878.
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in the collective bargaining agreement."6 8
The decisions offer school committees a suggested course of action, which
implies the need to consider or anticipate the effects of contract
language. Specificity can ensure retention of the school board's
authority for making personal decisions. School committees or their
representatives must then carefully weigh the implications of negotiated
contract language, or at least become more familiar with the procedures
in order to take the burden off the courts.
The issue of dismissal becomes more critical in view of the necessity
to lay off employees due to declining enrollments. The concluding portion
of Section 42 maintains the rights of committees to dismiss a tenured
teacher whenever an actual decrease in the number of pupils in the school
of the town renders such an action advisable.
The declining enrollments in schools across the country caused
teachers to press for seniority clauses in their contracts. A dilemma
is created because not only must school committees uphold negotiated
contracts, but also state requirements governing educational programs
and affirmative action commitments.
Teacher lay-offs in Massachusetts have not, as yet, caused the
possibility of conflict in statutory compliance. However, the current
fiscal situation may find the courts filled with public employee discrimi-
nation cases. 6 9
6 8Danvers v. Tyman. Mass. 360 N.E. 2nd 877 at page 882.
6 9Massachusetts Bar Association Conference, MCAD speaker, March 25,
1981.
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In summary, collective bargaining in Massachusetts has developed
under the same constraints placed on the public education nationally.
The demands for educational accountability emerged from the social move-
ments of the 1960's along with the bargaining rights of teachers.
The following section will review the union's position on its
obligation to be held accountable for negotiated decisions affecting the
quality of educational services.
C. The Union View of Accountability to Parents, Students and Taxpayers
The quest for accountability in education arose out of public
dissatisfaction with school systems' inabilities to demonstrate that
the funds provided were achieving the desired results: a public education
which provides basic skills enabling graduates to find employment or seek
higher levels of education.
Traditionally, children have been held accountable for what they
learn. Success or failure was largely a matter of how hard the child
tried. But if education is to accomplish more, it seems reasonable to
look to the teacher as a key factor in the development and improvement of
learning ability. Furthermore, as noted by the President's Commission on
School Finances in 1972, the bargaining rights of teachers have created an
additional requirement of accountability. If they are able to negotiate
their pay and workloads, then they should be obligated to submit to
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outcome measures.
The union position on accountability towards taxpayers, students and
parents in all cases calls for the accountability of other participants
7 0R. W. Hostrop, et al. (eds), Accountability for Educational Results,
Hamden, Connecticut: Linnet Books, p. 22.
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in decision making to share responsibility for the educational results.
This position is similar for both the National Education Association and
the American Federation of Teachers.
The NEA states that teachers can only be accountable when the public
supports education commensurately with its expectations of education.71
The AFT argues: "Teachers resent having to teach in
overcrowded classrooms, handling emotional problems of disturbed children
and working without proper supplied and instructional materials. These
matters fall within the province of administrators, school boards and
taxpayers. If teachers are to be accountable to the public, the public
must be accountable to the teachers." 7 2
Both organizations hold the public responsible for the amount of
revenue they are willing to generate through taxation. But the public
who continues to pour more and more money into education must, in turn,
be accorded the right to know that the money is somehow being tied to
student achievement. Wages have never been related to client need,73
but rather to the need to increase wages in relation
to inflation rates.
The 1980-81 National Education Association Handbook states in its
Resolutions concerning Accountability and Assessment that:
"NEA maintains that educational excellence
for each child is the objective of the
educational system."7 4
7 1Helen Bain, "Self-Governance Must Come First, Then Accountability."
Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. 51, April, 1970, p. 413.
7 2 David Selden, "Productivity Yes, Accountability No." Nations Schools,
Vol. 89, May 1972, p. 50-51.
7 3Lieberman, op. cit., p. 85.
741980-81 National Education Association Handbook, Washington, D.C.:
NEA, p. 232.
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The statement is followed by an accountability provision which holds
classroom teachers accountable only to the degree that they share responsi-
bility in educational decision making, and to the degree that other
parties who share this responsibility - legislators, other government
officials, school boards, administrators, parents, students and taxpayers -
are also held accountable.
Historically, as noted, students have been held accountable for their
successes and failures. Unions continue to decry the adequacy of student
achievement tests, particularly if attempts are made to tie them to teacher
performance. The union argues that there are numerous variables affecting
achievement: socio-economic family background, emotional stability to
name but two. These variables prevent adequate measures from being
developed.7 5  Unions additionally oppose the use of
pupil progress and student assessment tests for purposes of teacher
evaluation, advancement on salary schedules, continuation of employment,
granting tenure, certification or promotion. 7 6  Some
argue that the. rating of teachers creates disharmony among members of a
school staff.77  To give accolades to some
might constitute a negative factor in terms of union strength and growth. 7 8
Some within the union organization have taken a more positive
approach to the issue of performance. One former Director of Research
75Selden, op. cit., p. 52.
761980-81 NEA Handbook, op. cit., p. 218.
"Teacher Evaluation - Trick or Treat." American Teacher, Vol. 58,
November, 1973, p. 22.
7 8Robert Olds, How to Evaluate Administrative & Supervisory Personnel.
Arlington, VA: American Association of School Administration, 1977,
p. 45.
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for the AFT suggested a contract clause that provided for combined in-
service training with performance evaluation, with an emphasis on
improving instruction rather than pointing a finger at failure.7 9
By 1978, the emphasis on performance was overshadowed by resolutions
to protect tenured teachers. The AFT stated that tenure legislation
provides school boards with a mechanism for dismissal and establishes a
probationary period during which a candidate may be evaluated thoroughly.8 0
In collective bargaining, the union maintains that the public is
represented by the elected school board:
"The public is at the bargaining table in
the form of their board and staff represen-
tatives. To increase the number of people
present will inevitably fragment the bar-
gaining process to such an extent that real
honest interchanges, proposals and counter
proposals may be very difficult." 81
The illegitimacy of this argument has been questioned in previous chapters.
The issue will be addressed further in Chapter IV where alternative
processes will be described.
D. Critique of the Union Position on Accountability
The union's position on accountability raises several critical
7 9
"Teacher Evaluation: Topic for the Bargaining Table." American
Teacher, Vol. 8, February 1974, p. 8.
8 0AFT Convention Report, 1978, Section 3, p. 64.
8 1John Dunlap, "A Teachers Perspective on School Governance & Collective
Bargaining" in Robert E. Doherty (ed.) Public Access: Citizens and
Collective Bargaining in Public Schools, New York: School of Indus-
trial & Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1979, p. 71 & 72.
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issues: (1) whether the public can be expected to support education with
no mechanism for ensuring results; (2) whether the collective interests
of teachers overshadows the necessity for providing individual teachers
with incentives to improve instruction; and (3) whether the request for
accountability can be pursued with the mutual interests of the negotiating
parties more directed towards improvement in the overall educational
system.
The AFT President, David Selden, in 1977, maintained that the taxpayer's
revolt arose out of the circumstances of success. That in 1945, only 50
percent of the population attained 12 years of education; in 1975, the
figure rose to 83 percent. He argues that in the 19th century, our
democratic society decided that education was the responsibility of all
citizens, not just those of parents of children in school.
"The education system now includes groups
who were not admitted before - those we
used to reject - those who weren't white
and middle class. We expanded the oppor-
tunity for education of other people's
children and that is what the budget
protest is about ... " 82
Selden's argument is compelling. Indeed, we all support education
through taxes. Accountability in the form of according the public some
link between resources and outcomes would seem reasonable. The reactive
stance of teacher organizations detracts from the problems teachers are
experiencing in classrooms. The multiplicity of children's needs,
physical, emotional and intellectual, are all exhibited in the classroom.
If the proper programs are not available, teachers are expected to cope
8 2David Selden, "Accountability: A Teachers View," in Accountability:
How It Works, Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia,
1977, p. 11 & 12.
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with these features of a child's development as well as to provide them
with instruction in basic skills.
With social reforms, desegregation, rights for the handicapped and
those who speak limited english, school systems were required to provide
instruction in these areas. However, the regulations governing programs
require an enormous amount of administrative time. Programs overlap which
create additional accounting problems for school systems. Educational
systems, because of the variation in deadlines for proposal submission,
often find coordinating such efforts impossible and, therefore, do not
seek the available resources.
School systems could not stop operating in order to plan implementa-
tion strategies; therefore, little generic teacher training was offered
to accommodate the teachers' need to comprehend the cultural and social
differences among children. Teachers were rarely included in planning
efforts, but they were expected somehow to provide adequate instruction.
With a barrage of programs to implement, crisis management became
the standard method of operation to ensure that all regulations, moni-
toring, progress reports were written and forwarded to the proper
authorities. The actual content of programs was often left to teachers
who became frustrated with the lack of support from the administration.
"Teachers come into the field of educa-
tion with high hopes, but the system
kills them. The process of psychic
self-protection sets, creating internal
defenses necessary to service in the
face of continued failure." 83
8 3David Selden, "From the President." American Teacher, Vol. 49,
May 1972, 2A.
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The necessary psychic self-protection became collective self-protection.
The development of which is understandable. Rather than for the school
system to accept overall responsibility for the quality of education, the
burden was placed on the teacher to perform. Fear of reprisal of indi-
viduals led unions to persist in their demands for excluding evaluations,
on any basis, from negotiated contracts, and, as enrollments decline,
protection for those who have given the most years of service.
The prevalent attitude among school boards is that teachers are
employees, and the teacher's insistence on participating in educational
policy making through collective bargaining, inhibits management capa-
bilities. School boards, when autonomous, were held accountable only for
their effectiveness in allocating resources. Teacher collective bargaining
came at a time when demands were made for results-oriented accountability,
and the teachers bore the brunt for the dissatisfaction of the public.
What has emerged is public school systems with no mechanism for
holding any party accountable for the quality of education. The union is
correct in demanding accountability from others, including taxpayers,
state legislators and school boards. The critical problem is where to
begin the obligatory process. How to encourage responsiveness and
cooperation among the parties in the joint formulation of policy changes
directed at improvement. In summary, the union's position on accounta-
bility has not changed substantially over the past ten years. The
development of the position evolved as a defense against having failure
in education placed squarely in the laps of teachers. The quest for
educational excellence is shortchanged in negotiating for limited resources.
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The public's lack of knowledge concerning what occurs at the
bargaining table implies a need for a change in the process. The union's
argument that the interests of the public are represented by school boards
is correct in theory. Contracts emerge but the costs overshadow the
content.
The energies of all parties must look toward the mutual interests of
providing the public with a mechanism for understanding the difficulties
associated with current public educational practices and collective
bargaining. The AFT's recognition of the need for standards and indivi-
dual incentives for performance in education (p. 5, Chapter II, Section
A) is the first step in accommodating accountability requests. The union
membership, however, cannot be expected to singlehandedly change the current
state of public education.
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CHAPTER III
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN BOSTON: THE CASE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Setting the Stage for Bargaining
1965 was a year of change for the Boston School System. Not only
did the State Legislature pass an act requiring collective bargaining
between municipal employers and employees, it also passed the emergency
Racial Imbalance Act. The Federal Government in the same year enacted
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) providing over $1
billion annually to schools with high concentrations of students from
low income families. In the midst of a fiscal crisis in Massachusetts,
in Boston it was also the year to elect a new School Committee.
"While Massachusetts citizens have been
preoccupied with local election campaigns,
a fiscal crisis of unprecedented serious-
ness has been building on Beacon Hill ...
The state operates on a fiscal year
starting July 1. Yet today, four months
later, there is no budget for the current
fiscal year ... Nor has one cent of new
taxes been voted to provide urgently
needed property tax relief ... to finance
the quality education promised to every
Massachusetts school child by the legis-
lature itself ... 1 84
That same day, the contest between candidates running for the School
Committee was highlighted.
"Today Boston gives its answer on how
it wants to handle the most explosive
issue of the 60's, the racial question
... The School Committee majority
8 4Boston Globe, November 2, 1965, Editorial, p. 34.
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which has consistently resisted efforts
to end racial imbalance through busing
and has held firm to the neighborhood
school idea, is running against a slate
of five candidates sponsored by the
citizens for Boston Schools." 85
The Racial Imbalance Act was enacted in response to the "Kiernan
Report" released in April. An advisory committee appointed by the
Commissioner of Education, Owen B. Kiernan, and the State Department of
Education, concluded that racial imbalance was educationally harmful
and should be eliminated.8 6  . The report
noted that Boston contained 45 "imbalanced schools," schools with more
than 50 percent non-white enrollment. 8 7  The School
Committee response to this allegation was a refusal to acknowledge
racial imbalance as a problem that ought to be eliminated.8 8
The committee additionally responded by filing a suit with the
State Court to have the act declared unconstitutional. The Court, in
its findings, stated:
"The Committee seems bent on stifling the
Act before it has a fair chance to become
fully operative. The objections it makes
are numerous and expressed with slight
deference. They are 'bluntly' proclaimed
as if the Committee could by force of its
own words make the burden fall upon the
Commonwealth to 'establish a compelling
justification' for the legislation." 8
8 5Ibid., p. 39.
86Morgan v. Hennigan, 279 Federal Supplement, 410 at p. 417 (D. Mass. 1974).
8 7Ibid.
8 8 Peter Schrag, Village School Downtown, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967, p. 83.
89227 N.E. 2nd 729 at 733.
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Following the School Committee election in November, the Chairwoman,
Louise Day Hicks, spoke of her success.
"This victory is yours. It belongs to
excellence and good quality of education.
I thank you on behalf of the children ...
This tonight is a vote of confidence.
The people are speaking. We hear just
a vocal minority, but tonight through
the democratic process we are hearing
the majority."9 0
The vocal minority Mrs. Hicks referred to had at least produced a 65 per-
cent voter turnout of eligible voters in the black community.
The Executive Secretary of the NAACP, Thomas Atkins, said of the
turnout:
"When 64 percent of those eligible to
vote in the Negro community get out and
vote, this means that the Boston power
structure will have to look at the
Negro and his demands." 91
Both the Boston Teachers Union (BTU), affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor, and the Boston Teachers Alliance, an independent
organization, avoided taking a position on the issue of integration.9 2
"The Teachers Alliance would not declare
itself, primarily because of a sharp
split in members attitudes. A small
faction in BTU endeavored to fashion a
pro-civil rights policy. But the Union
as a whole ignored racial imbalance,
arguing that the real problem was econo-
mic, not racial, and the real need was
money from the Mayor, not integration." 9 3
90Boston Globe, November 3, 1965, p. 12.
91Ibid.
9 2Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 166.
9 3Ibid.
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Those teachers who did voice an opinion in favor of integration were
reprimanded for their efforts. Twenty teachers did sign a statement in
support of the Kiernan Report.
"Those teachers reported that shortly
after the statement was published each
was visited and reprimanded by a member
of the school administration ... The
Boston Teachers Handbook states: 'So
long as an official relationship exists
... teachers are not justified in pub-
lically expressing an adverse opinion
of school officials'." 94
The dissatisfaction of black parents with the quality of education
that black children were receiving had been expressed for some years.
In September 1963, the School Committee, in response to black community
leaders' charges that less money was being spent on the education of
black children, instituted two programs providing $115 extra per pupil
for teachers and materials devoted to providing remedial reading and
math. In 1965, with funds provided under Title I of the ESEA legislation,
the School Department began two additional programs, one giving individuali-
zed instruction to students and the other designed to teach english to
non-english speaking children.
"Although the general goal of the Title I
program is stated in the project proposal,
the goal is in turn modified by all sub-
sequent decisions which teachers, super-
visors and principals make. It is even
difficult to discern what criteria are
used by teachers to determine the type of
reading program in use. Students rarely
are given real diagnostic tests to determine
the nature of their reading problems." 9 5
94Herald Advertiser, March 2, 1966, p. 9.
9 5Joseph M. Cronin, Organizing an Urban School System for Diversity: A
Study of the Boston School Department, Mass.: Lexington Books,
1973, p. 125-126.
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ESEA funds also stimulated an increase in the number of school and
university contacts. However, a subsequent report found that the School
Department felt the universities to be ivory towers with no real commit-
ment to the city's problems and the university personnel felt the School
Department was too bureaucratic, rigid and defensive.96
In order to understand the special problems of the Boston school
system, it is necessary to explain the authority of the School Committee
and its relationship to the Mayor, the City Council and the State Legisla-
ture with respect to funding.
Unlike the School Committee in New York, for instance, which is
appointed by the Mayor, the five member School Committee in Boston is
elected at-large biannually. Studies of Boston School Committee election
voting patterns have shown that members have been drawn from particular
wards with the largest voter turnout. Twelve wards have never had any
representatives, many being predominantly black and other minorities.9 7
Although the School Committee delegated responsibility for the direc-
tion of employees to administrators at the central and district levels,
the School Committee had retained the right to affirm every personnel
decision in the system: promotions, transfers, retirement and leaves of
absence.9 8  After the fashion of most large school
systems, teachers in Boston moved up the career ladder to assume positions
of principals, assistant superintendent and superintendent. Those who
96
Ibid., p. 148.
9 7Robert Wood, "Behind the Numbers: Conditions of Schooling in Boston,"
mimeographed, 1981, p. 34-35.
9 8Cronin, op. cit., p. 165.
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moved up in the system tended to emphasize the maintenance of existing
priorities and the status quo.
"Everyone knows that it helps to appear at
School Committee meetings if one wants a
promotion, that it is a ood idea to 'go
around and get known. "
The organization of the Boston school system at the time consisted
first of the elected School Committee. There was a Board of Superintendents,
consisting of a Superintendent (the chief school administrator), a Deputy
Superintendent and Associate Superintendents and a Business Manager. Each
member of the Board of Superintendents was in charge of a department.
These departments included School Operation, Educational Planning, Personnel,
Staff Training and Development. There were Assistant Superintendents in
charge at the district level of principals and teachers.
Funding for educational staff and programs in Boston is provided
through a complicated statutory process based on the property tax. The
tax rate can be increased in order to support additional school appropria-
tions. Any appropriation above that of the preceding year must be
recommended to the City Counsil by the Mayor. 1 0 0
The Mayor can increase the property
tax rate, but the State Legislature is responsible for generating revenue
from the imposition of other types of taxes (sales tax, excise tax, etc.).
As noted on the first page of this chapter, the State Legislature enacted
legislation in support of equal education in 1965 but had failed to pass
any new form of tax to enable local school districts to absorb the costs.
9 9 Schrag, op. cit., p. 70.
1 0 0Acts and Resolves of the General Court of Massachusetts for 1936.
Chapter 244, at page 230.
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This complicated method of school finance, then, will plague the
city and the school system through the historical discussion of teacher
collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining for Boston teachers came at a time of civil
unrest, and mandates at both State and Federal levels to work towards a
more adequate educational system. Additionally, the continuation of
past practices were seriously questioned by community groups and the
teachers alike. As bargaining has occurred over the past fifteen years,
the system has become more complex in order to accommodate more State
and Federal requirements governing educational programs. This has
necessitated an increase in the central administration, as well as
teachers with special training. The Teachers Union and the School
Committee have attempted to deal with these problems during negotiations.
The complexity and diversity of needs have, I think, led the parties to
deal with or emphasize the most resolvable issues, leaving the goals of
education behind.
B. Boston Teacher Negotiations: 1965-1980
The following section will trace the collective bargaining pro-ess
over the past 15 years. The chronology for some years is sparse - what
occurred in collective bargaining was given little attention.
Although two teacher organizations had existed for some 20 years,
neither organization was overtly enthusiastic about gaining collective
bargaining or equivalent negotiating procedures.1 0 1
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10 1 Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 84.
"The President of the Union and the
Executive Secretary of the Alliance
were accustomed to operating informally
and by means of personal negotiations when
group interests were at stake. Each year,
when the school budget was formulated,
the leadership followed formal channels
of appeal through testimony before a
Salary Adjustment Board and the School
Committee. There were those who often
contacted the Superintendent and members
of the School Committee to make a case
through private persuasion." 102
But by 1963, other Massachusetts public employees were pushing for the
Mayor and City Council to grant collective bargaining rights. Teachers
and their organizations could not ignore the climate for change. Although
the School Committee, prior to the passage of legislation, was in the
majority opposed to such procedures, in October, 1965, in anticipation
of the passage of State legislation, the Committee voted to grant such
rights.1 0 3  The representational election was scheduled
for November 9, 1965. With the AFT (AF of L) winning elections as
bargaining agents in other major cities (New York, Detroit, Cleveland
and Philadelphia), the National Education Association stepped in in an
attempt to win the affiliation of the Boston Teachers Alliance, then
independent of national affiliation.1 0 4  The BTA,
however, chose to "win" on its own. The election outcome with two-thirds
of eligible teachers voting: BTU, 1,602 votes; BTA, 1,116 votes.105
1 0 21bid., p. 85.
1 0 3Schrag, op cit., p. 84.
1 0 4Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 87.
1 0 51bid.
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Bargaining began shortly thereafter and the sessions secured slight
salary increases for the entering salaries of $5,460.00 and $5,940.00.
The maximum for people with a Masters Degree was raised from $8,820.00
to $9,800.00, and for a Bachelors Degree, from $8,340.00 to $9,300.00.106
The union also won agreement in one-third of the schools
on a pilot program of duty free lunch periods for teachers and the
hiring of teacher aides. The original list of union demands, over 150
in number, included limitations on class size, assignment of guidance
counselors to all junior high schools, relief of teachers from clerical
duties, the provision of adequate library facilities in all schools, the
replacement of antiquated furniture, and the installation of adequate
rest room facilities. The major issue, however, was salaries and the
other demands were not seriously pressed.1 0 7
The year 1966 found the schools in no better shape. The State Depart-
ment of Education voted to withhold $4 million in state funds due to
Boston's refusal to comply with the Racial Imbalance Act. The Mayor
regretted this action as he stated it because it would necessitate the
imposition of a higher tax rate on the citizens of Boston or a reduction
in educational programs.108
The Boston Herald Advertiser ran a month-long series of articles
about the Boston school system and comparisons with other cities. (See
Appendix III) The Boston "Report Card," as the series was called,
1 0 6Schrag, op. cit., p. 69.
1 0 7Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 166.
1 0 8Herald Advertiser, April 13, 1966, p. 1.
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reported that the starting salaries for Boston teachers were the highest
in the State.1 0 9  (See Appendix IV.)
The inbreeding of teachers was noted because of the running of the
Teachers College of the City of Boston by the Public School System.
Most graduates of the Secondary Schools in Boston went on to the Teachers
College. 110 Teachers,
off the record, discussed the use of "social" promotions of students:
"If there's a nice looking girl at the
back of the room and she doesn't cause
any trouble, she'll probably get promo-
ted - even if she isn't quite up to par
... Or if a boy takes care of black-
boards and doesn't cause any trouble,
he'll probably get by too." 111
In 1967, teacher negotiations were finalized in March. Again, the
teachers gain in salary was reported to put them at the top not only in
Massachusetts but in all of New England. Starting salaries for both
teachers with Bachelors Degrees and Masters Degrees jumped $500.00 to
$6,000.00 and $10,000.00, respectively. The increases would cost $8
million above the preceding years' of $56.8 million - exceeding the
statutory limit of $5.2 million (based on tax assessment) and required the
approval of the City Council.l1 2
The contract also entitled teachers in the 18 largest elementary schools
duty free lunches. 1 3
1 0 9Herald Advertiser, March 2, 1966, p. 9.
1 1 0Herald Advertiser, March 6, 1966, Section 4, p. 1.
lilHerald Advertiser, April 13, 1966, p. 21.
1l2Boston Globe, March 28, 1967, p. 3.
1 1 3Herald Advertiser, March 28, 1967, p. 3.
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In 1968, negotiations reached an impasse in February. The major
issue was salaries but the union had 150 items to be negotiated. As one
School Committee member, Tom Eisenstadt, reported, salary matters take
up most of the bargaining time. 1 1 4
The School Committee was offering starting salaries of
$6,400.00 and $10,500.00. The union had dropped its original demand of
$8,300.00 and $11,500.00 to $7,100.00 and $11,300.00. A union official
was reported to say:
"I doubt if we'll settle for less than the
best in the state ... There is a trend
toward raising the minimums because most
large urban centers are having trouble "115
He pointed out that teacher strikes in large centers had helped to win gains
of this type 116 (Los Angeles, $6,800.00; New York, $6,750.00; Milwaukee,
$6,800.00; Chicago, $7,350.00).
The union was demanding duty free lunches for all teachers and to have
25 Assistant Principals freed from teaching duties and the hiring of 50
teachers to staff special classes, the School Committee held out for 20.
A union official estimated that there were between 800--1,000 students in
regular classrooms who required special help. The state set the maximum
class size at 18, so teachers would cover 800 students.1 1 7
The final agreement which was to cover two years offered an increase
for 1968-69 school year of $6,500.00 to $10,700.00, and for 1969-70 school
1 14 Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1968, p. 5.
1 1 5 Christian Science Monitor, February 15, 1968, p. 2.
1 1 61bid.
11 7Christian Science Monitor, April 4, 1968, p. 3.
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school year, a range of $7,000.00 to $11,000.00. The 25 Principals were
to be released from teaching duties. Duty free lunches for 1968-69 were
agreed to by two-thirds of teachers, and all teachers in the following
year. A compromise on special teachers was reached at 35. It was re-
ported that agreement on some non-monetary issues had not been reached,
in particular a demand for change in the promotional rating system
which graded teachers on an elaborate rating scale.1
1 8
The tax rate for Boston, due to school costs, would require an increase
of $6.86 per $1,000.00 valuation.
"Unlike other cities in Massachusetts,
School Committee additions need approval
from the Mayor -- the man who bears onus
for resulting increases in the city's tax
rate." 119
In July 1969, the union was threatening to strike if demands were
not met. Louis Vangel, BTU's business agent, said negotiations were bogged
down over union demands for increased severence pay, additional staff in
elementary grades and more guidance and testing personnel.
1 2 0
By mid-August, the parties were reported close to
agreement on salaries but, as the BTU President John F. Reilly contended,
there was a conflict arising because the School Committee refused to
consider "innovative educational programs for the children of Boston."121
A strike was averted when agreement
1 1 8Interview, Past Deputy Superintendent, March 31, 1981, and Christian
Science Monitor, April 5, 1968, p. 5.
1191 Christian Science Monitor, April 4, 1968, p. 3.
120306 GERR B-10, July 21, 1969.
121310 GERR B-ll, August 18, 1969.
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was reached just before Labor Day weekend. The package would cost $1.5
million with salary increases of $500.00 to $1,200.00 and new fringe
benefits and severence pay. 1 2 2
1970 brought Boston its first teachers strike; a "Professional Day
Boycott" was staged on March 24 "to dramatize their demands for higher
wages as well as their concern over the deterioration of the schools"
as one union official reported.1 23
The union demands included a reduction in class size, more full-time
nurses, more full-time substitutes to maintain discipline, remedial
reading teachers and school psychologists.1 2 4
1970) The School Committee contended that the money was limited. They
had received word from the Mayor that he would give $10 million less
than the 93.6 million asked for to run the schools. 125
They contended too that what goes to higher salaries
cannot be available for educational improvements. 1 2 6  One
teacher reported:
"It's not fair to ask the teachers to sub-
sidize good education (that's the responsi-
bility of the taxpayers) with low salaries,
but it is not unfair to ask them to provide
some concrete evidence that they are 'On
Strike For Kids'." 127
122313 GERR B-12, September 8, 1969.
123342 GERR B-17, March 30, 1970.
1 24 1bid.
1 2 5Boston Globe, May 1, 1970, p. 13.
12 6Ibid.
12 7Ibid.
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A strike was called by a vote of union membership on April 29.
The union was reported to be holding out for a salary range of between
$8,000.00 and $12,000.00.128 One hundred
and six of the cities and two hundred and one schools were "inoperative."
Soon after the work stoppage, the Suffolk Superior Court at the urging of
the Labor Relations Commission enjoined the union from striking and imposed
fines of $1,000.00 per day against the union, $500.00 per day against the
Executive Secretary and the seven officials of the BTU negotiation team.1 2 9
Union President John P. Reilly stated:
"The School Committee has forced us to this
position by not making a salary offer or
changing its position on any of the union's
proposals for educational improvements."1
3 0
Suffolk Superior Court Judge Harry Kalne:
"As to the teachers, I say that, however
fair and reasonable and just your demands
may be, you must consider the plight of
the city and its ability to pay."131
The Mayor sent the City Council a school budget for the next year of
$81.2 million rather than $93.6 million as the School Committee had
requested. According to the School Committee, $81.2 million would cover
eight percent raises but none of the demands for educational improvements
128349 GERR B-5, May 18, 1970.
129 Ibid.
13 0Boston Globe, May 1, 1970, p. 1.
13 1Ibid.
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which were estimated to cost from $3 to $20 million per year.132
The strike ended on May 20 when the union accepted the School
Committee's offer to submit disputed educational and salary issues to
binding arbitration. The issues besides salary included permanent
appointments for all substitutes, provisional teachers and remedial
reading specialists.13 3
The Arbitration Panel proposed a new contract in August that would
cost $3.2 million for the rest of the year and $9.2 million for a full
year: salary ranges between $7,000.00 and $12,000.00; 120 reading teacher
were to be paid from Title I (ESEA) funds; teachers with 25 years of
service would receive a $500.00 Career Award for each subsequent year
of service. Substitutes and provisional teachers would receive either
permanent appointments or a $500.00 lump sum payment.134 The Mayor said
there was no money.135 The School Committee approved the arbitration
pact but Chairman Joseph Lee called the pact's approval "rewarding law-
breakers."1 3 6 BTU officials called the compromise "fair and equitable.,,
1 3 7
13 2Ibid.
133350 GERR B-2, May 25, 1970.
134364 GERR B-10, August 31, 1970.
1 3 5 Boston Globe, August 31, 1970, p. 1.
136364 GERR B-10, August 31, 1970.
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In 1971, negotiation stalemates led to the appointment of a fact
finder to resolve the salary dispute. The fact finder recommended a
6.5 percent increase, to a range of $8,200.00 to $13,800.00. The BTU
had wanted a range of $9,500.00 to $15,500.00. The fact finder stated:
"I have not come close to recommending
the unions proposed schedule, because
I believe the union asked too much for
one year, and because I have considered
the State's limitation on the city's power
to tax." 138
Headlines changes in the November School Committee elections of 1971 -
the Teachers Union was the biggest winner. The three committee members
given union backing were all elected. The union had revealed it had made
available $10,000.00 to buttress equally the three members elected. One
winning member had been a Boston teacher and a member of the BTU.
1 3 9
Little publicity surrounded the contract negotiations in 1972 and
1973. The union in November of 1972 pressed for the right to strike which
is outlawed under state statute.14 0
1973 negotiations were overshadowed by Finance Commission investiga-
tions of fund raising activities of School Committee members. At the
June hearings, teachers from Boston High School testified that their
school supervisor had tried to pressure them to buy and sell testimonial
13 8Herald Advertiser, August 5, 1971, p. 4.
13 9Herald Advertiser, November 3, 1971, p. 48.
14 0Herald Advertiser, November 30, 1972, p. 4.
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tickets the year before for School Committee member Paul Ellison. The
five teachers who testified said the pressure had "destroyed" morale
among teachers.1 41  It was reported,
too, that their advisor had indicated that if the purchase of tickets was
less than generous, Mr. Ellison would use his influence and take an
unfavorable stand toward the school. However, when confronted by one
of the teachers, Ellison denied that statement.142
The union did receive a 5.5 percent pay increase in November of
1973. It was reported that the School Committee, in approving the
increase, defied the Mayor's warning on spending. The School Committee
action approved a $4.8 million increase in addition to the $173 million
18-month budget. It also provided an additional $1.4 million for special
education teachers - which would still find Boston far short of the
requirement governing State Chapter 766 (Special Education) which were
to go into effect in September 1974.143
1974 brought special problems to the Boston school system. The
School Committee was charged by the Federal District Court in a June
Opinion of unconstitutionally fostering and maintaining a segregated
public school system.1 4 4
14 1Boston Globe, June 20, 1973, p. 1.
14 2Ibid.
143527 GERR B-22, October 29, 1973.
144379 Fed. Supp. 410.
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The first phase of the plan, given the short time between June and
the opening of school, was to involve the "re-districting" plan developed
earlier by the State to bring Boston in compliance with the Racial
Imbalance Act.
The BTU argued that the reorganization of the school system would
be too educationally disruptive.145
The BTU was particularly concerned about the transfers and reassign-
ment of teachers called for in an effort to desegregate the teaching
staff. 1 4 6 The Court had found that in the school year of 1972-73, of
the total 356 black permanent and provisional teachers, 244 were assigned
to 59 schools, all of which had a majority of black student majority.14 7
The Court further argued that the complex provisions in the union contract
covering teacher transfers added to the problem.148 The process for
filling vacancies in the system were filled first by transfers from
within the system based on seniority, black teachers - many as provisionals -
had no right to transfer or promotion under the union contract.1 4 9
The Court issued its "Memorandum and Orders on Faculty Recruiting
and Hiring" on July 31, 1974, which specified the hiring of one black
to one white teacher in the future until a goal of 20 percent had been
reached. (At that date, the percentage of black students was 35 percent.)
1 4 5Harry C. Katz, "The Boston Teachers Union and the Desegration Process."
Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., mimeographed, December 1980, p. 3.
1461bid., p. 4.
147379 Fed. Supp. 410 at 459.
148Ibid., p. 456.
1491bid.
75
The BTU appealed this provision to the 1st Circuit Court on the grounds
that that percentage was unrealistic (20 percent based on approximate
black population of the city). The BTU suggested a 12 percent quota
incorporating the percentage of black college graduates and black college
students in Boston. The Appeals Court, however, remained unconvinced
that the school system would be unable to find a pool of 20 percent
qualified black teachers.
In the midst of implementing the desegregation plan, the union
in September accepted a 5.5 percent salary increase. The union addi-
tionally reported that it would soon proclaim a procedure for individual
teachers to deal with reassignment and discrimination problems.
1 5 0 The
union accepted that pay increase but submitted the final decision to
arbitration. In January 1975, the arbitrator awarded the teachers an
additional four percent increase retroactive to September 1, 1974,
bringing the total increase to nine percent. The BTU President, John
Doherty, reported his "disappointment" with the award as the union had
wanted a 20 percent increase with a cost of living clause.
1 5 1
In 1975, the second phase of the desegregation plan came to fruition.
On September 22, however, a teacher's strike was called. The issues
unresolved at the time negotiations broke down were over pay, extra
hours, job security and health and welfare fund payments.1 5 2 The
Superior Court issued injunctions and fines against the union as it had
150571 GERR B-18, September 9, 1974.
151589 GERR B-16, January 20, 1975.
1 5 2Boston Globe, September 23, 1975, p. 12.
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in 1970. The Federal District Court issued the "Memorandum and Further
Order on Plaintiff's Motion in Reduction to Labor Dispute" filed
September 23, 1975, the second day of the teachers' strike.
"The BTU strike has caused parent and
student confusion and uncertainty as to
the safety of attending public schools
and doubt as to whether any education
will take place during the duration of
the strike ... The constitutional
rights of the plaintiff case and the
public interest of the community in
having its schools open are the over-
riding concerns of this court."1 5 3
The strike lasted one week. The chief of the union negotiating team
said there were 1,642 pickets at high schools, 1,131 at middle schools,
and 1,430 at the elementary schools.1 5 4 Black teachers, even though in
sympathy with union demands, voted to cross the picket lines. The
vote, a spokesman reported, was in the interests of black children who
would be in school.1 5 5 A member of the union executive board indicated
that most black teachers were members of the union and understood the
issues. "The vote to cross the picket line only creates confusion."1 5 6
The strike, ending September 29, was to cost the city $13 million.
The agreement included a six percent raise for teachers and aides,
raising the minimum starting salary from $9,772 to $10,358 a year, and
career awards of $200.00 for teachers who had taught more than three
years in the system.157 The teachers agreed to spend two-and-one-half
15 3Morgan V- Kerrigan, filed September 23, 1975, p. 2 (D. Mass. 1975).
1 54 Boston Globe, September 23, 1975, p. 4.
1 5 51bid.
1 5 61bid.
157656 GERR B-15, October 6, 1975.
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unpaid working days per month for tutoring, parent conferences and
meetings. All permanent and tenured teachers were granted job security.1 5 8
The BTU worked without a contract from August 1976 through August
1977 and had received no pay increase during that time. During July 1977,
members of the parent advisory councils, established as a component of
the desegregation plan, staged a rally in support of the union's demand
to have class size reduced. Teachers distributed leaflets and helped
to organize the parent support.159 When an agreement was finally
reached in September 1977, the package provided no provision for class
size reduction. Salary increases were accepted in lump sums rather than
the usual percentage pay increases and a job security clause protected
all permanent and tenured teachers for one year only. The BTU President,
Henry Robinson, was quoted as saying:
"No other big city teachers union has that
clause (job security) and looking at
declining enrollments in this city, the
possibility exists that some teachers could
be left hanging here if they don't have a
contract ... One of the primary complaints
is class size ... but this was the best
deal we could get at this time without
going on strike. 1 6 0
A teacher, however, at the Taft Middle School was reported to say:
"I think it was a big mistake to ratify
the contract because the big issue was
class size and not money."161
The following year in September of 1978, the Boston teachers defied
union leadership and voted to accept the offer of a five percent increase
15 8Ibid.
1 5 9Interview, Community District Advisory Council staff and past member,
April 27, 1981.
1 60 Boston Globe, September 6, 1977, p. 6.
161Ibid.
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in salary in each of the next two years. The 17 member executive board
of the union voted not to accept the offer. The teacher membership did.
"The President said the vote weakens
the union's bargaining position because
it undercuts union leadership. He said
too few of the union's rank and filers
are involved in union activities through-
out the year, and that these 'once-a-year'
people had turned the vote against the
leadership."162
The 1980 negotiations brought the ratification of a three-year
contract in September 1980. The contract provides a 7.5 percent salary
increase for the first and second years and an 8.5 percent increase for
the subsequent third year. The contract specifies that when lay offs of
teachers occur, and not until 1982, they will be made by seniority. Job
security for all tenured teachers is continued until 1982.163
1980 brought the passage of Proposition 2 . The voters in Massachu-
setts wanted relief from the property tax increases. The provision
limits local property taxes to 2.5 percent of the full value of the
community's taxable property. Communities where the total tax assessment
exceeds 2.5 percent must cut taxes by 15 percent a year until they get
down to the 2.5 percent limit. For the education of students in Boston,
it may mean almost certainly a reduction in teachers.
The Mayor has told the School Committee that he will limit next
year's school budget to $210 million, the same as this year's appropriation.
The School Department has already overspent its budget by $30 million.
162778 GERR 18, September 25, 1978.
163884 GERR 24, October 20, 1980.
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A mediator has been appointed by the Superior Court to moderate the
debates between the City Council, Mayor and the School Committee to
find money to keep the schools open in compliance with state attendance
requirements. It is reported that holding the budget at $210 million
would require the dismissal of 2,200 teachers.1 6 4
The expected lay offs have already caused the courts to be called
into the battle. The School Committee filed a suit to have the three-year
teachers' contract dissolved or require the city to pay for it. The
cost would require $15 million to provide the 7.5 percent raises specified
in the contract. The BTU filed a counter suit asking the courts to force
the School Committee to live up to its contract.1 6 5
The State Legislature is embroiled in a battle to come up with a
tax package to relieve the fiscal problems created by Proposition 2 .
All the while, on one knows from one day to the next if schools will be
open. Negotiations are carried out almost daily by city officials,
the teachers' union and the School Committee.
The current fiscal cirsis in Boston now has plagued the city
through each year of the collective bargaining process between the
School Committee and the teachers. The public was aware of conflicts
only when publicized. Throughout, the salary demands of teachers, no
matter how reasonable, were reported and highlighted as one of the
direct causes of Boston's financial situation. Because the negotiations
1 64Boston Globe, May 5, 1981, p. 14.
165Ibid.
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by state law are exempt from open meeting, the outcome can only be
ascertained from reviews of the final contracts. However, copies of the
reviews are not readily accessible. For instance, although by law the
State Labor Relations Commission is to have copies of all contracts on
file, the Commission has only two: for 1973-74 and 1974-75.166
One major accountability problem, then, is created by the limited
access to the final contracts for the public. Other problems will be
illustrated in the following section: the Analysis of the Bargaining
Process in Boston.
C. The Analysis of the Bargaining Process in Boston
The analysis of the Boston case will be viewed within the context
of three key problems created by collective bargaining between the
teachers and the School Committee. These problems are: (1) how that
process has affected the balance of power; (2) the ability of the nego-
tiating parties to represent their entire constituency; and (3) the
community's ability to absorb the costs of the contracts.
BALANCE OF POWER
AFT President Albert Shanker has stated that "Power is taken from
someone. Teachers, as one of society's powerless groups, are now
starting to take power from supervisors and school boards. This is
causing and will continue to cause a realignment of power relationships."
1 6 7
16 6Labor Relations Commission staff, March 15, 1981.
1 6 7 Albert Shanker, "The Erosion of Lay Control," in James W. Guthrie,
et al., Public Testimony on Public Schools, Berkley, California:
McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975, p. 90-91.
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A power imbalance is created through the teacher collective bargaining
process in several ways: the personnel practices, the ability of the
school committee to hire, fire and evaluate has been limited by teacher
contracts and the tenure clause in the statute governing schools; the
ability of management and administrators to direct employees during
their supervision; and the effect of third-party awards.
The ability of school department management and school administra-
tors to direct employees has been restrained by school committee and
teacher union negotiations. The 1980-82 contract provides a no lay-off
clause protecting all tenured teachers until 1982. Additionally, the
union thwarted efforts to institute a staff performance evaluation pro-
cedure.
Teachers in the early days, prior to collective bargaining, were
elaborately ranked and tested. The practice was, at some point, modified
(the union raised the issue in 1968) and teachers were informally given
ratings of satisfactory or unsatisfactory. It is reported that some
teachers were displeased because the new system lumped everyone into
categories that offered no rewards or incentives to work more successfully.1 6 8
A new evaluation was developed during 1980 by the Senior Staff at
the School Department. It is both diagnostic and prescriptive in nature,
and provides an opportunity for mutual boss/subordinate performance
assessment and for the creation of strategies designed to improve
performance. 169
1 68 Interview, past Deputy Superintendent, March 31, 1981.
1 6 9Wood, 1981, op. cit., p. 29.
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It is reported that the union chose not to participate in the
development of the testing instrument. They chose rather to retain
their right to bargain about the test once it was developed. Although
the test was to be administered this year to teachers whose last mark
was unsatisfactory, the union has filed a grievance which forced the
parties to negotiate further.1 7 0 The union feels the instrument to be
too cumbersome and legalistic, and the time required to administer the
test properly is unrealistic and might lead to a cursory implementa-
tion.171 Another source, however, indicates the real issue is that
the evaluation allows a teacher to receive a mark of excellence as well
as satisfactory or unsatisfactory.1 7 2
The attempts to institute state mandated student performance testing
has been fraught with similar conflicts. This test, some argue, would
definitely detect insufficient instruction on the part of teachers.1
7 3
The union has again filed a grievance to demand negotiations concerning
the implementation of the test. The union's position is that the chosen
test is to include a curriculum package for instruction. Pre and post
testing is required to ascertain the performance imporvements of students.
The tests are to be administered by reading teachers and coordinators.
The union states that many students had not been instructed with the
curriculum required by the instrument. The test was to be administered
1 7 0Interview, School Committee negotiator, May 6, 1981.
1 7 1Telephone interview, BTU official, May 8, 1981.
1 7 2 Interview, past Deputy Superintendent, March 31, 1981.
173Ibid.
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by regular classroom teachers. 17 4 Other minimum competency tests have
been administered in compliance with the State Mandate.
The current BTU contract includes clauses allowing teacher partici-
pation on committees dealing with, to name only a few: curriculum,
in-service training, evaluation procedures, teacher transfers, minority
recruitment. It is reported that many of the committees exist only on
paper.175 This is reported true at the local school level. The problem,
as one principal pointed out, is that many times the provisions are not
enforced by the School Committee. Some teachers will not participate
or are called upon by the central office in their office of specializa-
tion to perform other duties, although the contract specifies that
teachers are required to spend 90 minutes per month in tutoring and
meeting with parents and students.1 7 6
Since teachers must be paid time-and-a-half for any meetings held
after school, efforts on the part of parents seeking consultation are
difficult. One principal holds an open house one day a year which re-
quires allowing the students to be dismissed early. In an attempt to
give parents more time to communicate with teachers during the open
house last year, the principal decided to allow students to be dismissed
at an even earlier time. The teachers filed a grievance based on the
fact that past practices had been changed without their sharing in the
decision process.l77
1 7 4Telephone interview, BTU official, May 8, 1981.
17 5lnterview, School Committee negotiator, May 6, 1981.
1 7 61nterview, past Deputy Superintendent, March 31, 1981.
177 Ibid.
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A final problem is treated by the use of third parties to resolve
conflicts. The collective bargaining statute allows for the entrance of
a third party when it has been established by the Labor Relations
Commission that an impasse has been reached. These methods act to absolve
the parties of their responsibility to resolve conflicts. The legal
battles that have ensued may take years until final outcomes are decided.
The parties cannot be held to account but arbitrators at the present time
cannot be held accountable either. The costs incurred as a result of
arbitration awards are not as critical as the ability of the parties to
pass on responsibility. The 1970 strike was ended by the union's
agreeing to submit salaries and other issues to binding arbitration.
But when the outcomes of the Arbitration Award were accepted and approved
by the School Committee, the Chairman stated the pact was "rewarding
lawbreakers."1 7 8 Additionally, City Corporation Councilman, Herb
Gleason, was reported to assert that the arbitration effort, which
ranged over 38 issues, was not binding on the School Committee.
1 7 9
The School Committee has fought arbitration awards on a number of
occasions. In May of 1977, the MLRC ruled that the School Committee had
acted unlawfully when it unilaterally adopted residency requirements for
employees without first discussing the matter with the union. The
Commission stated:
"A decision by the School Committee does
not fall outside the scope of bargaining
merely because the decision is made with
178364 GERR B-10, August 31, 1970.
179Ibid.
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an eye toward the interest of the public
in a sound educational system." 1
Later in that year, the Court upheld an arbitrator's award which
had found the School Committee in violation of the 1976-78 Contract,
Article X, "Handling New Subjects." The School Department in May announced
that final examinations would be given to elementary school students.
There had been no policy on this subject prior to this time. The issue,
as the Court pointed out:
t ... was not whether the Committee, in
the absence of consultation clause, could
unilaterally institute the final exam, a
question heavily laden with policy consi-
derations, but merely whether there had been
a violation of an agreed to procedure." 1 8 1
The Court added that the award did not prohibit the School Committee
from eventually instituting the examination.
"While we do not foreclose the possibility
that a clause of this nature might in some
instances improperly obstruct the freedom of
a school committee to promulgate and administer
educational policy, nothing in this record
suggests that adherence to its minimal bar-
gaining obligation poses any threat to the
committee's ability to freely develop policy
here ."182
It does not seem unreasonable for the union to have some say in
decisions in both these cases, which do affect working conditions. It is
argued, though, that obtaining union approval on every policy decision
prohibits effectual functions.1 8 3
180709 GERR, May 23, 1977.
181389 N.E. 2nd 970 at 975.
1 8 2 1bid., at 977.
1 8 31nterview, past Deputy Superintendent, March 31, 1981.
86
The power of decision making is then directly affected by the
collective bargaining process. The ability of the School Committee and
its administrators to direct and manage employees has been limited by
contract clauses. The major issue in bargaining is salaries. The
union over the years has demanded improvements in school programs, but
during the negotiations, demands for improvements somehow became lost.
The parties are not held to account for the manner in which they prioritize
demands for improvements.
REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE
The democratic electoral process allows the public to select
members of the School Committee at large. Union leaders are elected by
a vote of the bargaining unit membership. Each party's ability to
represent the interests of all its constituents is sometimes called into
question given the outcome of negotiations. These difficulties stem
from: the relationship between the elected school committee and the
teachers' union as part of the electorate; the school committee's ability
to place the interests and needs of parents and students above the demands
of the union; and the union's ability to comply with all provisions of
the contract if clauses are contradictory: Affirmative Action versus
Seniority.
Personnel practices within the school system have allowed a curious
situation to arise. Union members are included in the "public" who
elect them as officials. The publicity given the successful election
of union-supported candidates in the 1971 election and support in the
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form of campaign contributions1 8 4 is not a one-time occurence. The
Finance Commission's report of 1975 provided evidence of the amount of
money school department personnel had given in ticket purchases to
testimonials.
Campaigns are still supported in large amounts from the school
personnel.185 We all have the right to form coalitions in support of
those candidates we feel can best represent our interests. We do not
have the added advantage, however, of being rewarded for our efforts and
support.
The union, after successfully helping to elect favored candidates,
then sit at the bargaining table with those same officials in an effort
to gain higher salaries and improved working conditions. The possibility
of guaranteed votes on particular issues can only be surmised. But, as
in 1977 when the union leadership admitted conflicts but would not dis-
close their nature, this type of secrecy breeds skepticism in the minds
of others who have supported the candidates as well.1 8 6
Perhaps the respective parties take on different roles at the
bargaining table. It was reported that Boston negotiations are not
exempt from the conflicts that arise. The conflict is reported to ensue
because the School Committee maintains that teachers are employees; the
union, on the other hand, sees teachers as professionals.187 Some
parents see the School Committee as giving in to the demands of the union
18 4Herald Advertiser, November 3, 1971, p. 48.
1 8 5Wood, 1981, op. cit., p. 34.
1 8 6Boston Globe, September 2, 1977, p. 1.
1 8 7 Interview, school committee negotiator, May 6, 1981.
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because of the relationship that exists through the School Committee's
retention and preoccupation with personnel decisions.188 Whatever the
case, maybe the relationship might present a conflict of interest in
the bargaining process.
The School Committee is elected to represent the interests of all
its constituents, not only those who offer their pledges of support.
The School Committee, from 1965 until 1974, refused to accept any
comprehensive plan for integration of the public school system.
1 8 9
The committee tried to have the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 declared
unconstitutional.190 Their efforts were denied.
The School Committee, as currently elected, raises questions of
representation. As noted earlier (p. ), the at-large elections have
consistently drawn members from certain districts. 9 Additionally,
few members have had a background in educational administration.192
The School Committee members do not participate in the actual
negotiations. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 333 of the Acts of 1978,
which was to give the Superintendent more decision-making power, the
School Committee, through its legal representative to the negotiations,
would review demands and give instructions. More as a "ritual," members
would show up at the final bargaining meeting.193 They stayed out of
the process so as to maintain good personal relationships with their
1 8 8Finance Commission Report, 1975; and interview Community District
Advisory Council staff, April 28, 1981.
189U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D. C., 1975, p. XVI.
190227 N.E. 2nd 729.
1 9 1Wood, 1981, op. cit.
1 9 2Ibid.
1 9 31nterview, School Committee negotiator, May 6, 1981.
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194
employees.
Chapter 333 provided that the Superintendent would be the Executive
Officer of the School Committee:
"No person shall be elected or appointed
by the School Committee unless such person
shall have been nominated for such ... by
the Superintendent."i195
The Superintendent, then, became the agent of the School Committee during
the subsequent negotiations, though the Committee retained authority
for the final decisions.
One incident, not reported in the text thus far, arose concerning
past practice issues. Boston's new Skills Training Center, after 18
years of planning, was to open in 1979. The old Boston Trade School was
to be closed and, as with the closing of old schools and opening of new
schools, staff was transferred on the basis of seniority.196 Additionally,
197
lateral transfer rights are outlined in the teacher contract. The
Superintendent and staff argued that the Occupational Resource Center
was a unique facility requiring a staff with specialized and the most
current skills. The positions were posted and outside candidates were
recruited in compliance with the orders of the Federal Court. The
screening of candidates provides a mechanism for the community to partici-
pate in the process. The process in no way prohibited teachers at the
194 Ibid.
1 9 5Acts and Resolves of the General Court of Massachusetts, 1978,
Chapter 333, p. 230.
1 9 6Telephone interview, Deputy Director, Operations Management, BSD,
May 7, 1981.
1 9 7Contract, Boston School Committee and Boston Teachers Union, Local
66 (AFL-CIO), September 1980-August 1982.
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Trade School from presenting their credentials and going through the
rating process for positions. The union first argued for past practices
of lateral transfer rights under the contract for trade school teachers.198
The School Department argued that the job descriptions were new and
candidates were expected to have added experience in such areas as
staff development. The union then argued that the job descriptions
merely outlined expanded teaching positions. The Deputy Superintendent
for Management Operations was asked to review the qualifications of the
teachers in question and found six that appeared not to have necessary
credentials. In the meantime, the rating process took place. Only one
of the six deemed unqualified chose to be rated. The grievance filed by
the union required further negotiations between the School Committee and
union officials. 1 9 9
The authority for the final decision was ultimately left by law to
the School Committee. The Committee "did not bite the bullet" but
knuckled under to the union pressure. The School Committee vowed to
uphold the contractual obligations outlined in the collective bargaining
agreement. Those persons newly hired were replaced by the old Trade
School teachers. 20 0 As several parents have reported, "Some students
won't enroll in the ORC because they know they won't learn anything."2 0 1
198
Phone interview, BTU official, May 8, 1981.
1 9 9 1nterview, School Committee negotiator, May 6, 1981, and phone
interview, Deputy Director, Operations Management, May 7, 1981.
20 0Phone interview, Deputy Director, Operations Management, May 7, 1981.
201
Interview, Community District Advisory Council Staff, April 28, 1981.
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A dilemma was created by the legal procedural requirements of the
collective bargaining agreement and the legal charge vested in the
School Committee to provide quality education. The Committee in this
case chose to be accountable by holding the contractual agreements.
The issue of class size has been debated during many negotiation
sessions. The union encouraged parents in 1977 to support them in their
efforts to have the maximum number of students allowed in a classroom
reduced. The final agreement excluded changes in class size. Parents
were surprised and neither the School Committee nor the union bothered
to explain the issue's exclusion.202 Neither party felt any obligation
to parents to justify their actions.
The Teachers' Union, by law, must represent the interests of all
those in its bargaining unit. 20 3 The ability to do this is raised
indirectly by the demands for job security in particular, not for all
teachers. In order to understand the problems, it is necessary to first
discuss the teacher position structure in the school system. Teachers
receive tenure after three years of consecutive teaching in the school
system. There are permanent teachers, certification from the State
Department of Education. Provisional teachers are hired for one year,
receive tenure after three years of teaching but they do not automatically
become appointed as permanent. Provisional teachers are, then, not
accorded the same rights as permanent teachers.
202Interview, former staff member, Citywide Parents Advisory Council,
April 28, 1981.
2 0 3Acts and Resolves of the General Court of Massachusetts, 1965,
Chapter 763, p. 556.
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The quest for job security with enrollment declining during the
1970's led the BTU to demand and receive that clause in its 1975 contract
settlement for all permanent and tenured teachers. This protected the
rights of many of the black teachers hired at the direction of the Federal
District Court.
By the 1978 negotiations, teachers on provisional status were
excluded from protection of the "excess" procedure regulating seniority
and bumping rights.204 Some argue that this protects the interests of
the "traditional and politically dominant components of the union
membership." 205
"The existence of a separate class of
teachers with provisional status pro-
vided some assurance to permanent
teachers that any lay offs that did
occur would not spread into their own
ranks."206
The provision in the 1980-82 contract provides job security for all tenured
teachers until 1982 and then lay offs only by strict seniority. The
current fiscal crunch in Boston may require lay offs of over 2,000
teachers. Lay offs by strict seniority may widen the gap and bring the
dilemma of seniority versus affirmative action to a head. The issue
then is, can the union leadership protect the rights of all its members.
There are rumblings among BTU members of slates of candidates for
Executive Board elections, those members dissatisfied by the policies
and procedures established by union leaders and dominated by the pre-
dominantly white, permanent teachers.207
204Katz, op. cit., p. 12.
2 0 5Ibid.
2 0 6 Ibid., p. 11.
20 7Ibid., p. 13.
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Precedents have already been set for resolving the dilemma of
protecting rights by seniority and affirmative action specified in
contract clauses. The decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
6th Circuit which was decided March 3, 1981, upheld an affirmative
action consent decree over state law concerning lay offs by seniority
and the collective bargaining agreement. A consent decree was signed
by the parties and approved by the court in November 1974. The city Fire
Division in the decree made a commitment to affirmative action and a
minority recruitment program so that within five years "the ratio of
minority employees within the Fire Division reasonably reflects the
ratio of each minority group to the total population of the City of
Toledo."
In 1973, the percentage of blacks and minorities was 16 percent.
By 1980, the Fire Division included 7.34 percent black and 1.33 percent
minority employees. In 1980, a fiscal crisis struck Toledo. The City
Manager ordered a seven percent budget reduction in firefighters with
lay offs by seniority which would decrease the percentage of black
employees to 5.48 percent and hispanics to .78 percent. Plaintiffs
filed a motion in the district court to enjoin the lay off of minority
firefighters. The defendants appealed. The Appeals Court felt the
consent decree to be a commitment of the city to promote integration.
The union as intervenors and the city argued that the district
court's order contravened Ohio law (governing lay offs) and the terms
of the collective bargaining with the city.
94
"A Federal Court's power under the Supremacy
Clause to override conflicting state laws
and/or private agreements is well established
... The record reveals the long, tortuous
path which minorities have had to tread to
achieve equality in Toledo ... In 1974
when the consent decree was entered in this
case, it looked like final justice had been
achieved. Unfortunately, the appeal demon-
strates that there is still a long way to
go." 2 0 8
Representational issues arise on both sides of the bargaining table.
The difficulties associates with School Committee representation will
require resolution by statutory change. The Courts will have the final
say concerning the dilemmas assessed and presented by conflicting
statutory and contract provisions.
FISCAL STABILITY
The budgetary decision making process in Boston is complicated by
the State Legislature, and the continuing reliance on the property tax
to fund the major portion of public services.
The 1936 statute governing spending for schools in Boston separates
costs for construction and furnishing of new schools, alterations and
repairs, fixtures and all other costs. Nothing prevents the Mayor, on
request of the School Committee, from recommending, and the City Council
from passing, additional appropriations for school purposes. Section 3
states:
"The votes of the School Committee of said
city making appropriations as aforesaid
shall have the same force and effects as
208 Brown v. Neebs, Docket No. 80-3468, filed March 3, 1981 (6th
Cir. 1981).
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orders or votes of the City Council
thereof appropriating, ... subject
to the same provisions of law in res-
pect to approval by the Mayor, except
that a vote of four-fifths of all the
members of the School Committee, ...
shall be necessary to pass such approp-
riations over the veto of the Mayor."2 0 9
The School Committee, then, has veto power over the Mayor's objection
to increases in appropriations, subject to City Council approval. The
power to tax and raise revenues in support of increased educational costs,
other than the property tax, rests with the State Legislature. The
State Board of Education acts as the legislative arm for educational
mandates.210
The School Committee is delegated the "charge" of its local school
district by the State Board of Education. The elected School Committee
is not paid for its service in the form of a salary. Each member has
paid assistants.
This variety of factors in the budgetary process, holding varying
roles, authorities and responsibilities, disburses the issue of accounta-
bility. With the statutory addition of collective bargaining, a new
power base was established which further disbursed the public's ability
to hold persons accountable. It seems unfair to ask only the parties to
the collective bargaining process to look at their impact on fiscal
stability. It should rest with all elected local and state officials
first. Almost every year since bargaining began, there are cries that
the city has no money, but each year additional appropriations are
20 9Acts and Resolves of the General Court of Massachusetts, 1936,
Chapter 224, p. 206.
210
Myers, op. cit., p. 75.
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approved. Collective bargaining agreements were reached prior to budget
decisions only through 1968. Each year since that time, although the
statute suggests bargaining prior to the budget process, agreements are
not reached until the school year has begun. It is reported that the
threat of strikes are more useful to the union either just before school
opens or while school is in session. 2 1 1
A willingness of a community to pay for public services without
some process of accounting is, in Boston, illustrated by the vote of the
electorate on ?roposition 2 . The cities' response was to cut direct
services while the State Legislature developed an alternative tax package
to help absorb expenditures historically paid for by property tax
increases.
The key issue is not whether providers of public services deserve
annual wage increases, but whether the salaries can, in some way, be
tied to client need and service quality. The difficulties surrounding
the development of such measures has been noted. The burden of costs
cannot be seen totally as the result of public employee union's collective
bargaining. Others in the process have the authority to pursue alterna-
tive methods of generating revenues. If those with authority under
current statutes are unable to effectively be held to account for their
part in solving fiscal problems, perhaps the only answer is statutory
change; however, attempts to limit the power of the various actors has
been met with political displeasure. Conflicts between the Mayor and
2 1 1Interview, School Committee negotiator, May 6, 1981.
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the School Committee continue to make efforts at mutual problem resolution
most difficult.212 Conflicts between the Mayor and the City Council
only add fuel to the fire. The burden of conflict most directly affects
the public. Administrators, parents and students do not know from one
day to the next whether schools will be open.
The fiscal implications point to the fact that no party is currently
held accountable for their actions. The public is kept abreast of the
progress of negotiations through the sensationalized reports presented
by the media. The issue of accountability is sheltered by the complexities
of statutes governing the degree of authority held by various actors.
The problem may be resolved only through legislative change, enabling
the public to at least be capable of determining where the authority
for decisions lies.
2 12Phone conversation, Mayor's Office, Public Relations Staff, May 6,
1981.
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CHAPTER IV
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
APPROACH IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION
A. Introduction
Thus far, I have discussed the difficulties associated with unioniza-
tion and collective bargaining generally in the public sector, and par-
ticularly in the field of public education. The general public clearly
has a stake in the outcome of the negotiated decisions2 13  yet
there is a lack of agreement on just what role the public can play in
the collective bargaining process.
In the field of education, parents deserve to participate in all
aspects of collective bargaining that affect the quality of their
children's education.
"If special interest groups (parents) have
no persuasive legal or moral claim to par-
ticipate directly in the bargaining process,
they nevertheless may have a strong and
legitimate interest in outcomes of bargaining.
Their children will be educated under a
system of employment relations established
by collective bargaining agreements."214
Four alternative approaches are currently used to ensure participation
of parents in the bargaining affecting the quality of public education:
open public practices; multi-level bargaining; the use of ombudsman; and
multi-party bargaining. These vary, first, by the degree of participation
2 1 3William E. Simkin, Mediation and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining,
Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1971, p. 356.
2 1 4Tim Bornstein as cited in 879 GERR 21, September 15, 1980.
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extended to persons other than the parties directly involved; second, by
the phase of bargaining (pre, during, post) which during participation or
access is allowed; and third, according to the extent of accountability
to the public at large.
B. Description of the Four Approaches
Although union and school board representatives may meet and confer
about specific issues throughout the school year, there are three critical
phases in negotiations leading to the ratification of a written contract.
The first is the pre-bargaining phase during which the parties present
their proposals or demands. The union may present demands to which the
school board reacts or the board may present counter proposals. (The
number of demands depends in part on the limits placed on the scope of
bargainable issues by the relevant state statutes.) The second phase
encompasses actual negotiations. The party representatives begin by
conceding certain issues and narrowing the agenda to critical demands.
The final phase entails proposed contract ratification and approval by
the school committee and union membership. Each phase involves the
consideration of a great deal of information. Not all the alternative
approaches allow full disclosure of this information.
Although none of the four alternative approaches would seem, by
itself, to help ensure better accountability of the parties, they do
provide components that, with modification, could alleviate some of the
problems associated with the current collective bargaining approach.
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1. OPEN PUBLIC PRACTICES
Public scrutiny of the bargaining process is allowed during different
phases of the process in different states. In Wisconsin, the District of
Columbia and California, the unions and school boards are required to
present their initial proposals to the public but the negotiations are
closed. The Florida statute requires the actual bargaining sessions to
be open to the public. Kansas also mandates that every meeting, conference
and discussion during negotiations (except those involving mediation and
fact finding) is subject to the open meeting laws. The Idaho statute
does not provide for actual open sessions but requires that an accurate
record of the negotiation proceedings be kept and made available for
public inspection. Both Idaho and Alaska require that joint ratification
of the final settlement be made in open session.215
These open meeting practices fall under
the heading of "Sunshine Laws" which began to emerge in the 1970's in
response to the public's demands for inclusion in the bargaining process.
The strengths and weaknesses of the public approach are most clearly
illustrated by the process in Florida where its application of an existing
sunshine law to the collective bargaining process has been the subject of
controversy since enactment in 1974. Both the school board and the
union have noted a number of drawbacks, but each feels that the open
process possesses strengths that can be used to their advantage. The
2 1 5For this section, generally, Marvin J. Levine, "The State of Sunshine
Bargaining Laws." Labor Law Journal, November 1980, p. 709-715.
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union sees it as a way of "forcing recalcitrant employers into the em-
barrassing position of defending management policies and philosophies
which have not changed since 1900.",216 The
Executive Director of the Florida school board states that open meeting
requirements aid management because union proposals including "typical
boiler plate demands written in their national offices," show the public
that "few if any demands refer to children or education." (GERR 685:B-
27) The media in early years was reported to highlight the differences
of the parties. Negotiators were reported to act more like politicians,
engaging in rhetoric for its effect on the observer. 2 1 7
Additionally, constituents might mistake accommodations for weaknesses. 2 1 8
By 1978, these weaknesses in the process in Florida were
reported to have been overcome. The "showy aspects of earlier years are
a thing of the past."2 1 9
In summary, open negotiations allow the public to view the actual
negotiation process, and forces the parties to justify their demands and
concessions. However, the public is merely an observer and has no means
2 1 6 Donald D. Slesnick, "A Union Perspective." Journal of Law and Education,
Vol. 5.(4), October 1976, p. 493.
2 1 7John Ralph Pisapia, "Trilateral Bargaining Practices in Public School
Contract Negotiations." Journal of Collective Negotiations in the
Public Sector, Vol. 8(4), 1979, p. 343.
2 1 8Ibid., p. 344.
2 1 9Robert E. Doherty (ed.) Public Access: Citizens and Collective Bargain-
ing in Public Schools, New York: School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University, 1979, p. 42.
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of presenting their positions on the issues.
2. MULTILEVEL BARGAINING
Multilevel bargaining is often used in industrial labor relations.
Business and union leaders negotiate a master contract centrally that
covers only those issues that are "national" in scope. Normally this
covers basic economic issues, that is, wages and fringe benefits. Issues
that are either company or plant specific are left to decentralized
bargaining.2 20  Such an approach might be applied to
urban school districts which are large enough to decentralize by district
or individual school. Issues affecting specific areas of the city or
individual schools would be negotiated at the decentralized level.
A limited experiment of this sort occurred in Newark, NJ. In the
Spring of 1974, the teachers' union and a small group of parents from
one school successfully negotiated a formal supplementary agreement
regarding the implementation of a federal program. When first presented to
the Board of Education, the agreement was opposed-on the grounds that the
independent agreement was an attack on the board's authority. It was
later ratified.2 2 1
The strength of this approach would rely on the ability of the
school board to delegate authority to district and local school personnel.
One strength would be the requirement of local contracts tailored to
22 0Kochan, op. cit., p. 105.
2 2 1Carol Camp Yeakey and Gladys Styles Johnston, "Collective Bargaining
and Community Participation in Educational Decision Making: A
View Toward Trilateral Bargaining & School Reform." Journal of
Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, Vol. 8(4), 1979, p.
354.
103
fit local needs. This approach would allow the community to help deter-
mine the best method of allocating resources for educational instruction.
The weaknesses are inherent in the organizational structure of both
centralized school operations and collective union objectives. A dis-
bursal of decision making authority to local districts would make admini-
stration of the overall management of the system more difficult, parti-
cularly with respect to federal and state assisted programs which require
coordination at the central level.
From the union perspective, this approach weakens the power of the
union as it encourages fragmentation and an identification with the
local community rather than with the central union leadership. 2 22
On the other hand, it would give recognition to
the fact that there are differences in school needs, particularly where
a variety of different programs are conducted.
In short, the multilevel approach requires modifications in the
overall structure of a school system. This may create management
difficulties at the central level. It would, however, allow the community
to participate in the determination of local school needs.
3. THE OMBUDSMAN APPROACH
Ombudsman are usually appointed to let the "little guy" cut through
the "red tape" of large organizations. Usually, Ombudsman spend their
time finding out how to get something done, or working to get satisfaction
2 22Yeakey & Johnston, op. cit., p. 354-355.
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for a grievance.2 23  An Ombudsman can also increase
the representation of the consuming public in the administrative process.
"Too often, standards developed to guide
public servants if they exist are often
unpublicized or even unavailable to the
citizen. Greater clarification, dis-
closure and dissemination of information
concerning substantive and procedural
policies and internal organization in a
manner digestible by the public should
be accomplished."224
in the field of education, it has been suggested by Cheng that an
Ombudsman might serve as "the protector of the Public Interest" - the
independent protector of students and those groups now largely unrepre-
sented in policy making and collective bargaining. 2 2 5
An Ombudsman approach is in use in a modified form in Rochester, NY.
Parent leaders suggested six names to the Superintendent of Schools who
then chose one parent to serve on the School Board's negotiating team.
The chosen representative is responsible for informing the public about
the positions taken by the board and the union. Other parent represen-
tatives also participate; they work with the School Board as it prepares
its bargaining position. Workshops are held by the School Board prior
to the selection of parent representatives to acquaint them with the
bargaining process.
223J.H. Foegen, "An Ombudsman as Complement to the Grievance Procedure."
Labor Law Journal, Vol. 23, May 1972, p. 289.
224Dalmas H. Nelson and Eugene C. Price, "Realignment, Readjustment,
Reform: Impact of the Ombudsman on the American Constitution and
Political Institutions." Annuals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Sciences, Vol. 377, May 1968, p. 131.
225Cheng (1974), op. cit., p. 34.
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The strength in this approach is that it allows a parent to actually
be a party to the negotiations and ensures that the school board takes
into consideration the interests of parents. It increases the dialogue
between parent and district administrators as well.
The weakness in this approach is that it is reported to create more
tension between the union and school board negotiation teams. The parent
representative to the school board team reported the union was in opposi-
tion to the submission of parent proposals for review. The reaction
was exacerbated by the content of the proposals which called for a
commitment on the part of teachers to parent participation and the
establishment of a joint committee to study the feasibility of parent
input into teacher evaluations. This caused a defensive stance to be
taken by the union.2 2 6  With a parent
as a member of the school board negotiating team, the parents are immedia-
tely viewed as being at odds with the union.
In summary, the Ombudsman approach in theory would allow the concerns
of parents to be raised during the negotiations. As practiced, it creates
a wider gap between mutual interests of the school board and union.
4. MULTI-PARTY BARGAINING
Multi-party bargaining involves the participation of a third party
in the typical union management negotiation process. Although multi-
party bargaining has not yet been tried at the primary or secondary
school level, Oregon and Montana have passed statutes calling for student
2 2 6Gayle Dixon "Parent Participation in Collective Bargaining" in
Doherty, 1879, op. cit., p. 54.
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participation in bargaining at the college level. In addition, students
have been included in formal negotiations at three Massachusetts State
Colleges. In both instances, student representatives were involved only
on issues of immediate concern to students.
The strength of the multi-party approach lies in its acceptance of
the legitimacy of public involvement in educational policy making. It
would provide a mechanism for ensuring local concerns were being at least
considered in negotiations.
The weakness of limiting access to a representative of parents will
not ensure the interests of students whose parents are not directly
involved in the participatory process and may not be heard. Critics of
this approach note the delays that might occur given an increase in the
number of positions that must be negotiated and resolved. Briefly, then,
the multi-level approach is most controversial. It changes the power
structure of the negotiating parties, recognizes the legitimacy of public
participation but requires a commitment on the part of the union and the
school board to judge parents as having an equal share in the decisions
that affect their children's education.
C. Do The Alternative Approaches Improve Accountability?
In order to ensure accountability in public sector negotiations,
the public must be informed about the negotiation process. The public
must also be kept abreast of specific proposals put forward by labor and
management and their justifications; the rights of all parties must be
clear along with the availability of methods of holding each party to
its agreement; an accountable system of negotiation will take into
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consideration a city's ability to pay when demands are formulated. Any
reference to a performance-based approach to service evaluation should
be made explicit.
These are the criteria that ought to be used in evaluating the
prospect of ensuring accountability under any system of public sector
bargaining.
1. OPEN PUBLIC PRACTICE
Open pre-bargaining practices allow the public to scrutinize the
positions of each party and may allow the public to assess the justifi-
cations put forward by both parties. To ensure accountability, the public
must be able to review past contracts, given access to the needs assess-
ments for the schools, and must be accorded a reasonable period of time
to review the proposals and justifications prior to the public session.
It would also be desirable if workshops for interested persons were held
to explain the bargaining procedures in use. Union representatives
might meet with parents on a district basis to provide further clarification
of the union's position.
At the pre-bargaining stage, accountability can be ensured only if
the public is "educated" about the complexity of the process, allowed to
ask for justification of demands and be given the right to respond.
Also, at the pre-bargaining stage, the public would be able to determine
the agreed-upon rights and responsibilities of the parties. This would
give parents an indication of who in the system was managing the implemen-
tation of the system. Not unless responsibilities for the implementation
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of contract provisions were specified in the final agreement could the
public hold the assigned parties accountable.
One Florida negotiator suggested that, while an open process might
ensure public accountability, it certainly did not ensure better bargain-
ing.2 27 However, open negotiations provide no true mechanism for public
participation. Parents are given only observer status. Assurance can
be given that any concessions made by either party are understood. The
delegation of authority for implementation may be surmised through the
discourse between parties. Access at this stage provides no mechanism
for educating the public in understanding the basis for concessions.
The post-bargaining phase is probably the least open to accountability
since agreements have already been made by the parties.
2. MULTILEVEL BARGAINING
Allowing for the different needs of local school districts, and
allowing bargaining at a decentralized level could give the public, as
parents, a sense of having some control over the programs and schools
their children attend. However, the main portion of the budget allocation
decisions, and whether they are in some way related to outcomes, would
still be made behind closed doors without the knowledge of how those
decisions were made. Besides fragmenting the union membership, as noted
previously, it would also perhaps fractionalize the public, thus raising a
plethora of competing proposals to meet the needs of particular schools
within each district.
227685 GERR B-27.
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Clearly, the parties should be required to establish district
priorities based on assessed needs. The parties would mutually agree
upon the allocation each school would receive. This would also necessitate
the school board delegating authority to the parties for the final
allocation decisions.
3. THE OMBUDSMAN APPROACH
The Ombudsman approach provides a mechanism for having public con-
cerns brought to the attention of the negotiating parties. The Ombudsman,
however, might be accorded no more than advisory status. This approach,
in terms of holding parties accountable, seems rather ineffective.
Until parents were organized, the Ombudsman might receive an enormous
number of specific complaints from individual parents. Presenting these
to the negotiating parties in a summary fashion might overlook critical
issues.
4. MULTI-PARTY BARGAINING
The multi-party approach, in theory, would grant the public the
greatest capacity for ensuring accountability. A requirement for
participation by all whose decisions affect the provision of service.
It would call for participation by representatives of the state, offi-
cials authorized to generate resources, other public officials whose
decision making authority affects the budget of services, the traditional
parties to the negotiations and the interested public.
This approach would allow the rights and responsibility to be
explicitly established. It would offer a forum for clarification of
positions where misunderstandings alone might be the cause of conflict.
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To summarize, then, no approach discussed individually ensures
that the criteria for better accountability are met. Additionally,
each approach presents implementation problems which will be discussed
in the following section.
D. Implementation Problems
As noted, no one of the four alternatives discussed is sufficient
to ensure accountability. Public participation can either be extended
voluntarily or by state statute. Unfortunately, attempts on the part of
school boards to voluntarily allow third party participation does not
afford the additional party the power to enforce its recommendations.
In Philadelphia, for instance, the school board allowed parent
representatives to sit on its negotiating team. After the first bar-
gaining session, the parents requested third party status because the
positions held by board negotiators were in conflict with those of the
parents. The board refused to grant independent status and did not
extend invitations to subsequent sessions.228
In Detroit in 1974, the community was offered only indirect involve-
ment in an effort to prevent a conflict similar to that in Philadelphia. 2 2 9
The plan provided for two representatives in each of the
eight districts to meet periodically with a representative of the super-
intendent's office to discuss issues and the process of negotiations.
There was no direct access to the bargaining table, and the chance to
understand the union's position was limited. 23 0
2 2 8Cheng (1976), op. cit., p. 115.
2291bid.
23 0Yeakey & Johnston, op. cit., p. 354.
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The Ombudsman, multilevel and multi-party approach imply a voluntary
joint commitment on the part of the school board and the union to consider
the interests of those affected by the negotiated agreements. The parties,
too, might recognize that it is in their joint self-interest to educate
the public about the process.
The first consideration for implementation is the process for
determining who will represent the public and whether the third party
will be independent of the school board's negotiating team. Some argue
that since the public is represented by the school board, inclusion on
the board's negotiating team is appropriate since school board members
rarely participate in the actual process. 23 1 Others
argue that this practice widens the gap between the two groups that most
directly affect the learning experience of children - the teachers and
parents.232
The modified Ombudsman approach used in Rochester, as noted earlier,
documents the latter argument and difficulties encountered between the
union and parent representatives.
The Rochester case serves to illustrate a necessary positive factor
for success. That is, the character of the school board chief negotiator.
In this case, the person met with parent leaders to present both the
board and union position and willingly explained further any points that
the parents found to be unclear. Attitudes, then, on the part of all
participants are critical to the success of any approach.
23 1Ibid., p. 358.
23 2Ibid., p. 354.
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Mandated open public practices exhibit additional implementation
difficulties for the pre-bargaining phase. The experience in California
suggests necessary safeguards. The California Teachers Association felt
only initial proposals, not counter proposals, had to be made available
to the public. Thus, the definition of "disclosable information" must
be made clear.
In Berkeley, a Citizens Advisory Committee established by the Board
of Education found that without professional staff or consultants, the
committee had difficulty interpreting budgetary information and developing
alternative cost proposals. Thus, if a school board allows even advisory
participation, the board must be willing to provide initial staff support
until the committee becomes familiar with various aspects of proposal
costs.
The open negotiation process in Florida points up more information
problems. Parents, acting as observers, were given no training or
information concerning the process prior to negotiation sessions. The
sessions were often long and carried out for many days in succession.
Parents lost interest in viewing a procedure they did not understand.
Over the past several years, parent organizations have felt workshops
across the state would help parents comprehend the process.
2 3 3
Implementation problems are inherent in all approaches described.
Both voluntary and mandated techniques display problems with selecting
23 3Doherty (1979), op. cit., p. 42.
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representatives, acquiring necessary information, receiving professional
assistance to better understand the process and having the rights of
the representatives afforded respect by the traditional parties to the
negotiations.
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CHAPTER V
A NEW APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. Introduction
The current collective bargaining practices in public education
offer little opportunity for the public to hold the parties accountable
for the decisions made during negotiations. Public concern for education
takes a variety of forms. There are constituencies within a community
whose primary concern is cost effectiveness; taxpayers without children
attending public schools. The business interests within a community
would be concerned with the salable skills provided through public
education. There are other constituencies who regard specific types of
educational programs as the major goal of education: programs for -
students with special needs, bilingual instruction, and vocational skills.
Within the school system the interests to be represented are equally
as diverse. Central management is interested in maintaining an ability
to direct employees in the delivery of service. Local and district
administrators view their interests in light of the daily operations of
schools. Teachers' interests include improving the instruction en-
vironment for students as well as for themselves, job protection, and
increasing their share in educational policy decision making.
Thus, the multiplicity of interests of constituencies must be
considered when developing a more accountable system of collective
bargaining. There are four themes that can be extracted from the problems
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illustrated in the preceding chapters. The questions in point concern:
(1) management rights and responsibilities; (2) an appropriate definition
of need; (3) performance measures and standards; and (4) budget/cost
constraints. A more accountable system must address each point in terms
of whose interests are to be taken into account, who establishes defini-
tions, and how to incorporate and protect constituency interests in the
bargaining practices. The following section will describe how this
might be achieved.
B. A More Accountable System For Negotiation
1. Management Rights and Responsibilities
The present system of negotiation places the major authority for
decisions affecting management rights in the hands of a lay school board.
The school board concern is primarily directed toward keeping the costs
of education at a reasonable level. In order to lower or maintain costs,
non-economic issues, including management rights have been negotiated
for and often traded away.
A more accountable system would demand that those who manage
participate in actual negotiations. The authority for negotiated decisions
concerning management rights - to hire and fire - and responsibilities -
to ensure efficiency - must be placed in the hands of the top system
administrator. Other system management personnel interests - department
heads, district superintendents and local school administrators - must
be represented at the table by the chief administrator.
Currently, administrators take little, if any, part in negotiations.
They are sidestepped by both union representatives and the school board.
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A more accountable system would allow local administrators to negotiate
with teachers over issues that affect the daily school functions since
each school may possess different program emphasis. Or it might be best
to perform negotiations at a district level among staff and teachers at
the elementary, middle and high school levels.
A most accountable system would then allow managers to participate
in the determination of teacher negotiations that currently hinder
administrators' ability to direct employees.
Personnel decisions, for instance, might best be negotiated at a
central level. The chief administrator present at the bargaining
table would need to demonstrate that all levels of management were in
agreement concerning procedures to be followed in personnel matters.
This would require a series of sessions among intraorganizational manage-
ment components.
2. An Appropriate Definition Of Need
The current system of bargaining defines needs most noticeably in
terms of costs on the part of the school board and job protection on the
part of teachers. A more accountable system would expand bargaining to
include those constituencies currently excluded from the bargaining
process.
There are four distinct categories under which identified constituen-
cies might fall, (1) management, (2) teachers, (3) parents, and (4)
non-parents. As noted earlier, management would be represented at the
table by the top system administrator; teachers by their elected leadership;
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parents by a representative chosen by organized parent groups by category
of concern. Non-parent groups - taxpayers - should technically be
represented by a member of a city council or the mayor. However a
public official definition of educational need may be limited. A more
accountable system might provide for ad-hoc committees selected by
community groups to represent the interests of business, municipal
finance and perhaps others concerned with specific types of educational
programs: bilingual, special needs and vocational education.
A more accountable system would allow negotiations to be carried
out at various levels within the system. The "down-up" approach would
provide a mechanism for bargaining at the local level about specific
issues. The difficulties associated with a multi-level approach will be
discussed in the following sections. Nonetheless, students' needs should
be more easily recognized at a local level. Issues left to the central
level would still require that the selected representative at the table
demonstrate that all interests of a particular constituency were considered.
This guarantee might come in the form of a signed agreement of objectives
by all persons included in the secondary bargaining structure.
A more accountable system would require the use of third party
neutrals to facilitate conflict resolution and ensure that the bargaining
focus is centered on specified objectives. A selected mediator would be
required to possess skills in dispute resolutions, a knowledge of educa-
tion and a stature and community respect that promotes trust.
Needs, then, are various and cannot be singularly defined. Accounta-
bility would require that the needs be defined by each group with specific
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interests and then guaranteed representation at the bargaining table.
3. Performance Measures And Standards
Current bargaining practices allow the issue of performance to be
considered secondarily. The establishment of standards and measures
for all system personnel would imply a joint understanding of system
objectives. The exclusion of standards offers no mechanism for comparing
performance or offering incentives for improvement.
A most accountable system would demand the development of performance
measures for teachers by service providers in conjunction with department
heads responsible for specific programs, with the intent being diagnostic
and prescriptive rather than preserved as castigatory. Management standards
can only be developed along with an explicit delegation of authority
to administrators for carrying out their specified responsibilities.
These standards, as well, should be jointly determined.
Student performance standards should also be established. A more
accountable system would be required to somehow tie costs to performance with
overtime salary increases based on improvement of teaching skills and
student achievement. Performance measures must be multiple and chosen for
their ability to compliment one another and present a comprehensive
picture of student and teacher needs.
Measures might be best developed at a central level, however, the
interests of those who must administer the evaluations must be given
consideration. Again, multi-level discussions would facilitate the
process of determining the feasibility and practicality of suggested
measures.
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4. Budget/Cost Constraints
The concerns of the public over cost efficiency are most vocal
during times of economic contractions. Once performance standards and
measures are in place, the costs of education can be monitored to ensure
cost efficiency.
As noted earlier, one party to the bargaining would be a representa-
tive of a non-parent ad-hoc committee on municipal finance. This party
to the negotiation would assess educational costs additionally in light
of the impact on other services.
A more accountable bargaining system would require parties to
offer justifications for costs in light of expected benefits in the
improvement of educational quality. This would be possible through the
use of technical assistance during the negotiation process by educational
cost experts and department of education personnel who might provide
comparative information by which to guage cost demand reasonability.
Finally, a more accountable system would require that negotiated
agreements be ratified prior to a community's annual budgetary determina-
tion. This would require that parties prior to any negotiating be pro-
vided with some idea of how much of an increase in costs the community
is willing to absorb. These interests would be protected at the bargaining
table by the non-parent public representative.
A most accountable system then would allow representation at the
bargaining table of interests directly affected by negotiations by
quality of service along with those parties concerned with cost efficiency.
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The system would demand that management accept responsibility for pro-
tecting administrative rights. It would require the joint establishment
of standards and performance measures that would tie costs to improved
achievement. The most accountable system would require definitions of
need to evolve from the bottom-up in terms of educational priorities,
but additionally the needs of those indirectly affected would be represented
at the bargaining table. The use of knowledgeable third-party neutrals
at all levels would serve to insure a proper weighing of priorities and
to sharpen party objectives.
C. Issues For Further Consideration
Any new approach to bargaining that ensures better accountability
for decisions requires consideration of a number of issues that present
recognized dilemmas for implementation. These dilemmas which must be
reconciled include: the definition of the public interest; (2) the
determination of issues appropriate for centralized vs. decentralized
decision-making; and (3) handling the multiplicity of performance ob-
jectives.
1. The Public Interest
The representation of all interests affected by negotiations is no
easy task. Even with the expansion of bargainers at the table, the
possibility of ignoring some constituency is likely. A more open
bargaining process would provide information to the community and
perhaps would allow interests not represented to be recognized. Community
agencies could be designated to disseminate information to the public as
well as to provide channels of communication for voicing concerns over
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particular programs.
The selection of representatives to protect constituent interests
is complicated by an approach that allows multi-level bargaining. Choosing
a person respected and trusted by all members of a bargaining unit whether
at the local or central level would require safeguards and guarantees
that all interests are recognized. A signed statement between parties
could be secured on issues of agreement, while the use of third-party
neutrals would help ensure a balance of power among parties in the
resolution of issues more in conflict.
2. Centralization v. Decentralization
The major concern to be addressed is how to determine in multi-
level bargaining what issues are best left to central level negotiations.
Totally decentralized bargaining could provide a specified percentage of
a school budget to each district dependent on the number of schools.
The problem with this approach is one of ensuring equity. Some districts
and local schools may be in need of more improvements than others.
Teachers may possess more power in having demands met. If the power
relationships among parties are unequal, mutually acceptable agreement
is unlikely to emerge.
The decision to include bargainable issues at specific levels should
then consider the effect it will have on the ability of administrators
to efficiently manage the system, whether the process at the specified
level will enhance or erode the relationship of the parties, and whether
decentralization will allow equitable decision making. Again the use of
third-party neutrals would help to ensure equality in the balance of power
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exercised by the parties.
3. Performance Objectives
The nature of public education has changed over the past few decades.
The emphasis while once on socialization and developing basic skills, has
been modified with advancement in diagnostic testing of learning disabili-
ties and other technological techniques for the improvement of learning
skills. There is little agreement over what an overall public education
system should provide. The variety of programs required by state and
federal mandates causes fractionization among educational personnel.
A most accountable system of bargaining allows public concerns
beyond basic skills to be addressed. Performance objectives should
include leadership skills, enhancing student self-perceptions and the
perceptions of the efficacy of education. Modifying objectives can only
be achieved through providing mechanisms for reviewing objectives and
coordinating decision making in light of the re-evaluation, by multi-
level discussions. As mentioned earlier, ad hoc committees could be
established to represent interests by type of educational program - this
would provide a forum for discussion by parents, department heads, advo-
cacy agency representatives and specialized staff that could then be taken
to the bargaining table. If interests are categorized in terms of
content and requirements for specific program areas - the needs and objec-
tives associated with each can be addressed more explicitly.
D. Conclusions
A new approach to bargaining in public education will entail time,
patience and a community commitment to enhancing the current perceptions
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about public educational systems. A most accountable system for negotiated
decisions may necessitate changes in legislation concerning funding for
education, the role the state plays in providing assistance to local
educational agencies for state mandated programs and modifications to
bargaining statutes to modify authority structures.
Any new approach that provides a mechanism for ensuring accounta-
bility must allow the interests of all constituencies to be recognized
and must establish procedures for equitably allocating resources.
The determination of whether the process should be open to public
session should be contingent on the degree to which a new approach
represents the interests of all concerned with the quality and costs of
public education.
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APPENDIX I
Myers: p. 45
Average Starting Salaries, School Year
1965-66 1971-72
Beginning
Teachers
Engineering
Accounting
Liberal Arts
Math-Statistics
Economics-
Finance
$4,928 $ 6,850
$7,548
$6,732
$6,216
$6,672
$6,600
$10,476
$10,080
$ 8,184
$ 9,468
$ 9,216
Source: NEA Research Bulletin XLIX (October 1971), Research Division,
NEA, p. 75.
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APPENDIX II
State Collective Bargaining Laws
Coverage States
(1) All-inclusive laws
(2) "All" employees, separate
laws
(3) Some employees covered:
Teachers
Police and Fire
Fire
All but state civil service
Local employees & teachers
Fire and teachers
Local employees & police
(4) No Laws
Florida*, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana+, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York#, and Oregon.
Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wisconsin.
Indiana and Maryland.
Kentucky, Oklahoma and Texas.
Alabama#, Georgia#, and Wyoming.
Michigan and Washington.
Nevada
Idaho
Missouri
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois@,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico@,
North Carolina, Tennesse, Utah, Virginia
and West Virginia.
(5) Employees covered by
separate laws (even if other
employees covered by other
laws):
Teachers
Police and Fire
Fire
State Service
Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Indiana, Idaho, Kansas,
Maryland, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington.
Kentucky, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota and Texas.
Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Wyoming.
California, Connecticut, Maine, Rhode
Island, Vermont and Wisconsin.
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*Allow local governments to have own systems if in conformity with
state laws.
+Except separate laws for nurses.
#Law operative only upon enactment of local ordinances.
@State service under non-statutory system.
Source: Hugh D. Jascourt, "Recent Trends and Developments," in Hugh D.
Jascourt (ed.), Government Labor Relations: Trends and Infor-
mation for the Future, (Oak Park, Ill.: Moore Publishing
Company, Inc., 1979), p. 10.
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APPENDIX III
Herald Advertiser, March 3, 1966, p. 4.
FIGURES FOR 1965
Population
Proportion Black
Median Income
Proportion Earning 4 $3,000
Proportion Earning > $10,000
Proportion In-Migrants
BOSTON
616,326
11%
$5,747
17%
14%
25.5%
PITTSBURGH
620,000
15%
$5,605
18%
14%
18%
SCHOOL
Enrollment
Percent Black
Annual Budget
Per Pupil Expenditure
Starting Salary: B.A.
M.A.
Teacher Pupil Ratio
Guidance Counselors/Students
(Secondary Level)
Operation & Maintenance Costs/
Pupil
93,055
25%
46.9 million
$478
$5,460
$5,940
25:1
800:1
$65
77,500
29%
35.2 million
$425
$5,300
$5,600
27:1
480:1
$66
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APPENDIX IV
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION: SURVEY OF STARTING SALARIES FOR TEACHERS
IN MASSACHUSETTS: 1965-66
(Representative sample as reported in the Herald Advertiser, March 2,
1966, p. 9)
Belmont 5,300 5,700
Beverly 5,000 5,400
Boston 5,460 5,940
Brookline 5,000 5,100
Cambridge 5,300 5,700
Concord 5,100 5,500
Lexington 5,300 5,800
Newton 5,250 5,650
Somerville 5,000 5,300
Springfield 5,100 5,600
Waltham 5,000 5,300
Watertown 5,000 5,500
Wellesley 5,200 5,600
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